Good news about Iran
(From The Japan Times Dec. 9 issue)

イランをめぐる米国家情報評価

In a sharp and striking reversal, the U.S. intelligence community has concluded that Iran has stopped work on its suspected nuclear weapons program. This revelation contrasts with the Bush administration's recent rhetoric warning that Iran's determination to develop a nuclear weapon could spark a war, and it has raised questions — again — about the administration's credibility.

Yet even if the threat has been exaggerated, the prospect of proliferation is no less real. The danger is that a more accurate assessment of the Iranian nuclear threat could diminish international vigilance against this danger.

A National Intelligence Estimate represents the consensus view of the 16 U.S. intelligence agencies on critical national security questions. While such judgments are inherently uncertain — they are based on data of unknown accuracy — they have become controversial in the aftermath of the Iraq war, which had been supported — wrongly — by an NIE conclusion that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction.

The last NIE on Iran's nuclear weapons capability was completed in 2005. It had "high confidence that Iran currently is determined to have nuclear weapons." But a new review, based on new intelligence, has reversed course. It concludes that Iran stopped work on that suspected nuclear weapons program more than four years ago.

Now, there is "high confidence" that efforts to build a nuclear weapon were suspended in 2003 and "moderate confidence" that the program has remained inactive since then. The NIE also concluded that it would take seven or eight years to produce enough highly enriched uranium to make a weapon if the program resumed and it expressed doubt over whether Iran even "currently intends to develop nuclear weapons."

That judgment is the result of an 18-month process that yielded a 150-page classified document based on 1,000 pieces of evidence. There was considerable new intelligence, including telephone intercepts of Iranian military officials complaining about the program's suspension. Reportedly, hardliners in the U.S. administration resisted the new conclusions, arguing the data could be disinformation; a rigorous review and testing process delayed publication of the NIE.

Critics note that only months ago U. S. President George W. Bush was warning that Iran's nuclear ambitions could spark World War III. When accused of exaggerating the threat, the president said he was not aware of the NIE's conclusions until only a week before. Mr. Bush also insisted that the new NIE actually supports his policies rather than undercuts them: Its conclusions indicate with more certainty than its predecessor that Iran had a covert nuclear weapons program — which could be restarted — and that Tehran's determination to pursue uranium enrichment for a civilian nuclear energy program could be diverted to a clandestine one if desired.

There is a temptation to leap to the conclusion that the revised NIE means that nuclear proliferation is not a real danger. That logic is seductive, but wrong. North Korea is proof enough that the nuclear temptation persists. (There is another dilemma for critics of U.S. policy: The Iraq intelligence fiasco suggests that any NIE should be treated with some skepticism. If the United States was wrong then, it could also be wrong now.)

The complexities of the negotiations with North Korea are also proof that containing the nuclear genie requires a broad-based approach that addresses all the dimensions of the proliferation challenge, in particular, why governments seek such weapons.

The NIE reasons that Iran's leaders are susceptible to international pressure, arguing that Tehran's decisions are guided by a "cost-benefit approach" rather than by a desire to rush development of a weapon irrespective of the political, economic and military costs. That suggests that the world should not use the NIE as an excuse for ending scrutiny of Iranian programs. Rather, the NIE supports the International Atomic Energy Agency's conclusion that there is still time for a negotiated solution to this situation. It backs a nuanced strategy of sticks and carrots that responds to the needs of all parties to the negotiations.

The new NIE is good news. The conclusion that Iran has put aside its nuclear ambitions is welcome. The world needs less nuclear powers, not more. It also suggests that diplomacy is still a viable option. This is not the time to turn our attention from Iran; it is an opportunity to step up negotiations with more awareness of the stakes and the respective positions of both sides.

このほど発表されたイランに関する米国家情報評価(NIE)は、イランがすでに核兵器開発計画を停止したと結論づけた。評価は、イランの核計画は戦争の原因になりうるとのブッシュ政権の主張に疑問符をつきつけた。

しかし、イランの核の脅威が誇張されているにしても、核拡散の現実的可能性は存在する。イランの脅威の新たな評価が、核拡散に対する国際的監視を緩めることもありうる。

05年のNIEは「イランは核兵器保有を計画している」と分析したが、今回のNIEによれば、核計画は03年に停止されたという確度の高い情報があるという。ブッシュ政権の強硬派は、偽情報の可能性があるとして、NIEの判断を批判した。ブッシュ大統領は数ヶ月前に、イランの核計画は第3次世界大戦の原因になりうると警告した。

今回のNIEで核拡散の危機は現実性がなくなったと判断したいところだが、それは誤っている。北朝鮮が、核開発の誘惑が存在する証拠だ。また、北朝鮮との核問題をめぐる困難な交渉を踏まえ、核拡散を抑制するには、なぜ各国が核計画を進めるのかという疑問に立ち返る必要がある。NIEによれば、イランは、政治、経済的損失に関わらず核兵器を開発するのでなく、「費用便益分析」に基づく決定をしているという。

そうであれば、NIEの判断を理由に、イランの核計画の監視をやめるべきではない。NIEは交渉による問題解決のための時間はあるという国際原子力機関の結論を支持し、「アメとムチ」式の微妙な交渉戦術を求めている。

イランが核計画を停止したとのNIEの結論は歓迎すべきだ。世界に必要なのは、核兵器の削減で、増加ではない。今は、安全保障の目標と双方の立場を十分認識したうえで、イランとの外交交渉を進める絶好の機会である。