Fifty years of peace

50年間の平和

War produced the 1951 peace treaty: not only the Pacific War, but also the Korean War. North Korea's surprise attack on June 25, 1950, on the South galvanized U.S. officials who read it, rightly or not, as a thrust aimed ultimately at Japan. Although there had been inconclusive debates in Washington about Japan's future, the Korean War made it clear that the Allied Occupation had to end and Japan had to get back on its feet and resume its place in international society.

The treaty was negotiated between Japan and the U.S, and in a fairly short period of time. Other governments attended the signing ceremony, but they could only sign the final document, not amend it. The principal issue for the U.S. was its desire to retain military bases in Japan. In response to that concern, the two nations signed their mutual security treaty hours after the peace treaty was concluded at the San Francisco Opera House.

Many historians have decided that the terms of the peace treaty itself were a sweetener designed to balance the intrusive rights granted to the U.S. by the security treaty. The argument over those rights given to the U.S. continues to this day; the controversy surrounding crimes committed by U.S. service personnel and the debate over the Status of Forces Agreement are one part of this legacy. Attempts to update and modernize the alliance have cast light on the clash between the demands created by the alliance and domestic political imperatives arising from the Peace Constitution. Squaring those two objectives continues to confound policymakers on both sides of the Pacific.

The difficulties of that last assignment have been exacerbated by the willingness of various Japanese governments to avoid a real national security debate. This, too, is a legacy of the two treaties. Japanese politicians have been quick to employ the bilateral security treaty as the foundation of national defense policy, but they have also used it as a shield to avoid a potentially divisive debate about Japan's proper role in regional and global security. That does not mean that the Peace Constitution is not a vital, living document. But the world has changed markedly since the Constitution was enacted by the Diet and the nation has studiously avoided any real scrutiny of its applicability to contemporary conditions.

There is a second part to this process that, sadly, seems to have stalled: Japan's efforts to build stronger relations with its neighbors. The 1951 peace treaty was only a beginning in this critical endeavor. Relations with South Korea and China were not normalized until 1965 and 1978, respectively. Yet, normalization has not led to normal relations. Controversies flare with appalling regularity, as proven by the recent firestorms over Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's visit to Yasukuni Shrine and the history textbooks.

Japan has much farther to go in allaying suspicions about the nation's commitment to peace and the purpose of national power. Our leadership must redouble its efforts to explain itself and our policies. Only then can we say that a genuine, durable peace has been concluded between Japan and its neighbors and that the legacy of World War II has been successfully dealt with.

Despite these complaints about unfinished business, it would be unfair to dismiss the work of a half-century ago. Japan has enjoyed peace for 50 years. Its alliance with the U.S. is a major reason for that. It is easy to forget the ferocious war the two nations fought and the vast gulf — not merely the body of water — that separates us. It is hard to imagine two countries that are more dissimilar, or an alliance that seems more unlikely. In 1947, a bilateral security alliance would have seemed unthinkable.

Yet for all our differences, Japan and the U.S. have built a partnership that has flourished during the second half of the 20th century. The two most powerful economies in the world are good friends and close allies. We work together on a variety of projects throughout the globe, and we stand together much more often than we square off. That is a remarkable achievement and one worth celebrating today.

The Japan Times: Sept. 8, 2001
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     サンフランシスコ講和条約を成立させたのは太平洋戦争だけではない。50年6月、北朝鮮の韓国への攻撃で始まった朝鮮戦争は、攻撃の最終目標が日本であると判断した米国に行動を起こさせた。この戦争で、連合国による占領を終結させ、日本を主権国家として国際社会に復帰させる必要性が明らかになったのだ。 講和条約については日米間で短期間の交渉が行われ、他の当事者国は調印式に出席したものの条約の最終文書に調印するだけで、修正はできなかった。在日米軍基地の保持という米国にとっての重要問題を受け、講和条約調印の数時間後に日米安保条約が締結された。

     講和条約の条件には、安保条約で米国に与えられた駐屯権の印象を和らげる配慮がなされていたと多くの歴史家が主張する。駐屯権論争は今も続いており、米兵の犯罪や日米地位協定に関する議論もその一部だ。日米同盟関係見直しの取組みは、同盟に伴う要求と、平和憲法に基づく義務が両立しがたいという事実を浮き彫りにした。両立をさらに困難にしているのは日本の政治家の態度だ。彼らは安保条約を国防政策の基盤として扱いつつ、日本が地域と世界の平和に向けて果たすべき役割の議論を避けるための盾として利用してきた。平和憲法の意義を否定するわけではないが、憲法が国会で成立してから世界は劇的に変化している。

     一方、近隣諸国との関係強化を図る日本の外交努力が停滞している。韓国と中国との間では65年、78年にそれぞれ国交が正常化したが、いまだ正常な関係が確立できていない。平和への決意と国力の目的に対する近隣諸国の疑念を解くため、日本は一層の努力をすべきだ。そうすることで初めて諸国との間に真の意味の和平が成立し、戦後処理が成功する。

     日本が享受してきた50年間の平和は、米国との同盟関係によるところが大きい。日米は、その大きな相違にもかかわらず、20世紀後半を通じて世界中の様々なプロジェクトで共同作業をし、対立より協力を目指し、良好なパートナーシップを築いてきた。それ自体驚くべき偉業の達成であり、賞賛に値する。

The Japan Times Weekly
Sept 15, 2001
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