The extent of cooperation

反テロ対策：国際協力の範囲

Stressing that Japan will "cooperate with the international community and take effective measures," the prime minister pledged to implement as soon as possible a seven-point antiterrorism program announced the preceding week. The package includes a bill seeking legal authorization for the deployment of the Self-Defense Forces to provide logistic support, including munitions transportation, for U.S.-led military strikes against terrorists.

The bill would allow the government to send SDF ships and troops to distant places, such as the Indian Ocean, for the first time in support of direct military operations. The proposal is in striking contrast to the passive stand that Japan took in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. At that time, the nation contributed a large sum of money to the U.S.-led multinational force but provided no physical support. This time around Japan cannot afford to stay on the sidelines.

But controversy is already raging over the draft legislation, largely because it leaves unclarified some "borderline" questions that could significantly affect the nation's security policy. The lack of clarity on these issues may be unavoidable to some extent, since the proposal was put together in response to the Sept. 11 tragedies. Now the Diet must thrash out the details.

The main question is whether sending noncombat units to areas close to combat lines would constitute "cooperation integrated with the use of force" — which is effectively prohibited by the Constitution. Such cooperation is essentially different from participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations, or PKO, following the end of fighting. SDF units operating not far from the frontlines might get involved in the fighting if hide-and-seek operations against elusive terrorists caused the frontlines to shift. The proposed easing of the rules on the use of weapons to protect SDF personnel has also been subjected to criticism.

Under existing legislation enabling Japan-U.S. defense cooperation, geographic guidelines are a major limiting factor; the SDF may support U.S. forces only in "areas surrounding Japan." The proposed antiterrorism law would effectively lift that geographical limit to enable SDF units to conduct activities short of combat operations in the Indian Ocean and other remote places.

The SDF, created exclusively for defending Japanese territory, has since expanded its role under the PKO cooperation law and the guidelines legislation. With the extent and scope of activity now expanding further, the Japanese public is concerned that the nation's future defense and security policy may change direction. The main concern is that the global fight against terrorism may open the way for wider SDF involvement abroad, possibly leading to the amendment of the Constitution, which "renounces the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes."

The prime minister, while expressing a firm determination to combat terrorism, stopped short of explaining the proposed legislation, leaving people wondering about his specific purposes and intentions. Nor did he spell out a broader antiterror strategy that includes cooperation in nonmilitary efforts, such as preventing and resolving regional conflicts and reducing the widening economic gap between rich and poor countries.

The political parties are divided over SDF deployment and related issues, clouding the prospects for smooth passage of the bill. The division was reflected in their different responses to a Diet resolution condemning terrorism. It was supported only by the three ruling parties — the Liberal Democratic Party, New Komeito and the New Conservative Party — and the Democratic Party of Japan, the largest opposition group. The Liberal Party opposed the resolution, as it did not make dispatch of the SDF conditional on a U.N. resolution approving U.S.-led military action. The Japan Communist Party and the Social Democratic Party, both of which are against sending SDF troops abroad, also objected.

All parties agree that Japan should work in tandem with other nations in a global campaign against terrorism and that such cooperation is essential to national survival and security. But they disagree on how to cooperate. Some of the differences, such as opposition to SDF deployment, seem unbridgeable, but others can be reconciled. A parliamentary show of solidarity, combined with the government's commitment to international cooperation, would send a powerful message to the world.

The Japan Times: Oct. 2, 2001
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     対策には米国主導の対テロ攻撃の後方支援に向け自衛隊派遣を可能にする法案が含まれるが、これは91年の湾岸戦争で日本が取った消極的な姿勢とは一線を画する。当時、多国籍軍に資金を提供しただけだった日本も、今回は傍観者ではいられなかったわけだ。

     しかし国会では激しい議論が戦わされている。日本の安全保障方針に多大な影響を与えかねない協力の｢境界線｣が明らかでないからだ。同時テロ対応策としての立法措置であるため、曖昧さは避けがたいにしても、国会は法案の詳細決定に努めなくてはならない。

     主な争点は、非戦闘部隊を戦闘の前線近くに派遣することが憲法で禁じられている｢武力行使を伴う協力｣となるか否かだ。国連平和維持活動への参加とは違い、戦闘地域近くで自衛隊が活動すれば、テロリストとの戦いで前線が移動した場合、戦闘に巻き込まれる可能性もある。また、武器使用規則の緩和も論争の的だ。現行の日米防衛協力の指針では、日本が米軍に対して行える支援は｢日本の周辺地域｣に限定されている。対テロ支援法案はその地理的制約を取り払って、インド洋など遠隔地での自衛隊の活動を可能にするものだ。

     自衛隊はPKO協力法と日米防衛協力の指針の下、その役割を拡大してきた。さらなる役割の拡大に対し、国民は日本の国防と安全保障の方向性が変わるのではないか、国際紛争の解決手段としての武力行使を放棄する憲法の改正につながるのではないかと懸念している。

     演説でテロと闘う決意を表明しながらも、首相は法案の説明をせず、非戦闘的協力を含む反テロ対策の全体方針も明らかにしなかった。自衛隊派遣の問題で与野党は対立し、法案の通過は難航しそうだ。しかし日本が世界と協調して反テロ運動に取り組むべきであること、そうした国際協力が国家の存続と安全保障に不可欠であることについては全政党の意見が一致している。どんな協力をするかという見解の相違なのだ。しかし相違の中には歩み寄れるものもある。国会の団結と国際協力に対する政府の決意を連携させれば、日本は世界に強力なメッセージを送ることになるだろう。

The Japan Times Weekly
Oct. 13, 2001
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