A green light for antiterrorism bill

テロ対策支援法案が衆院通過

The swift vote reflects the strong determination of the government and the ruling parties to get the bill through the Diet as soon as possible. In particular, it is a big boost for Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, who pledged support for the U.S. in a meeting with President George W. Bush following the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington.

The committee debate left much to be desired, however. The bill, which would significantly change the nation's pacifist security policy, was supported only by the three ruling parties — the Liberal Democratic Party, New Komeito and the New Conservative Party. The Democratic Party of Japan, the largest opposition group, changed its mind at the last moment and opposed the legislation.

Because the U.S. was already deploying its military forces, the Lower House failed to conduct a thorough debate. The Upper House will also be pressed for time, but this does not obviate the need for a more substantive debate. The task for the Upper House is to address the questions that have been left unclarified or only partially treated in the Lower House — questions that would arise when SDF troops were deployed for the first time near a combat zone far from home.

The committee debate skirted complex issues that could have opened a Pandora's box of constitutional problems. For example, the government chose to remain ambiguous on the potential military risks of an SDF dispatch and on the possible use of weapons in noncombat areas. Mr. Koizumi said that, in theory at least, the SDF could be deployed anywhere in the world and that weapons should be used at the discretion of individual soldiers or their commanders.

In normal circumstances, questions like these would have infuriated the opposition and brought the debate to a grinding halt. Nothing of the sort happened this time. Opposition members had to display a sense of realism; they overlooked certain ambiguities in the bill and avoided the kind of "semantics" that had dogged past debates on security policy issues. The common denominator was the belief that Japan should play a positive part in the international effort to stamp out terrorism. The main question that divided the ruling parties and the DPJ was procedural: whether SDF deployment plans should be approved by the Diet in advance. The DPJ insisted on prior approval but left the door open to ex post facto approval in an emergency. The governing parties, especially the LDP, initially maintained that post-deployment reports would suffice, but later offered a concession calling for ex post facto approval within 20 days of deployment.

These are not fundamental differences. Some sort of compromise would surely have been reached if only the two sides had been willing to cooperate. That is why the collapse of the meeting between Mr. Koizumi and DPJ leader Yukio Hatoyama was particularly disappointing. To be sure, the bill was to pass the Diet sooner or later because the governing coalition holds a majority in both Houses. But this legislation would have carried far greater weight, domestically and internationally, if it had also been supported by the largest opposition party.

The heads of the ruling and opposition parties often meet to strike a last-minute compromise. Sometimes they may come out with a dubious deal, but the central significance of such summit talks — finding common ground on national issues — cannot be overemphasized. The Koizumi-Hatoyama meeting failed to meet this test of nonpartisanship, leaving a blot on the record of summit politics.

It is tempting to suspect that the failure may reflect not so much discord over the bill itself as the internal politics of both the coalition and the DPJ. In fact, neither the coalition nor the DPJ is monolithic. It is difficult not to imagine that the two junior coalition partners would have felt alienated if the LDP had unilaterally reached a deal with the DPJ. The DPJ, a grouping of differing subgroups, meanwhile, would have found itself in disarray if it had joined hands with the LDP.

Whatever the reasons, it is clear that Mr. Koizumi's attempt to forge a wider parliamentary alliance for noncombat SDF deployment has failed. Logistical support, of course, is only one way for Japan to cooperate in the ongoing antiterror campaign. Nevertheless, the loss of opposition support in this area comes as a blow to the Koizumi administration.

The Japan Times: Oct. 18, 2001
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     しかし委員会での討論は十分でなかった。法案は日本の安全保障方針を大幅に変更するものだが、自民、公明、保守の与党三党の支持しか得られず、野党民主党は土壇場方針を変更し、法案に反対した。米軍がすでに配置につき、時間的圧力がかかる中、委員会は憲法論争という複雑な課題を避け、自衛隊の海外派遣に伴う軍事上の危険と、非戦闘地域での武器使用については曖昧にしておく道を選んだ。

     通常なら野党が憤激して議論が行き詰まるところだが、今回はそうはならなかった。野党は現実的観点から法案の曖昧さを見逃し、今までの安全保障議論につきものの、言葉の言外の意味にこだわる態度を避けた。日本が国際的なテロ撲滅作戦で積極的な役割を果たすべきだという共通の信念があったからである。

     与党と民主党の見解が分かれたのは自衛隊派遣の承認手続きの問題だった。民主党は国会の事前承認を主張したが、非常事態の場合事後承認も可能という立場を取った。与党側は、国会への事後報告のみで十分としていたが、後に、派遣後20日以内の承認という譲歩を見せた。妥協案合意も可能だったと思われるだけに小泉首相と鳩山民主党党首との会談の決裂は悔やまれる。政府与党は参院両院で過半数を確保しているから、法案は遅かれ早かれ国会を通過する。しかし最大野党の民主党の支持が取りつけられれば、国内的にも国際的にも法案の重みがずっと増していたはずだ。

     与野党の党首が国家的問題について共通の基盤を見出すことはきわめて重要だ。小泉･鳩山会談の決裂は、実は与党と民主党の間には法案に関する意見の相違が大きくないことの表れだという憶測もできる。自民党が一方的に民主党と手を結べば公明･保守党が疎外されたと感じただろうし、民主党内にも反発が出ただろう。

     理由が何にせよ、自衛隊の非戦闘展開に関し国会内の同盟関係を拡大するという首相の試みは失敗した。日本が反テロ軍事行動に協力できる道は当然ながら後方支援以外にない。しかし今回、野党側の支持を得られなかったことは小泉政権にとって打撃となろう。

The Japan Times Weekly
Oct. 27, 2001
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