A lesson from Mr. Schroeder

ドイツに学ぶ教訓

As in Japan, the German government was stunned by the terrorist attacks. Like Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, Mr. Schroeder quickly voiced solidarity with U.S. President George W. Bush, calling for "unlimited solidarity" with the U.S. And like Mr. Koizumi, the chancellor framed the need for a response within a broader framework: Germany's assistance was "the expression of our readiness to back up Germany's increased responsibility in the world with real action."

Mr. Schroeder wanted to dispatch nearly 4,000 troops to aid the international coalition. The contribution would include four ships to patrol the seas off the east coast of Africa, a medical evacuation unit and armored vehicles equipped to detect signs of nuclear, chemical and germ warfare. The troops would be deployed for one year to an area extending from the Arabian Peninsula to Central Asia, but they would not be involved in either ground or air combat.

While Japan's ruling coalition had divisions, they were not as deep as those that divided the chancellor from the leftwing of his own Social Democratic Party and its coalition partner. The Green Party, traditionally pacifist, was extremely reluctant to endorse the government's attempts to participate in international missions with a military dimension. In August, the government had to rely on opposition votes to approve troops for the NATO peacekeeping effort in Macedonia. In that vote, 19 members of the SDP and five Greens defected.

Facing a similar revolt, Mr. Schroeder decided to raise the stakes on a vote to dispatch German forces. He turned the ballot into a vote of confidence in his government, only the fourth such vote in Germany's postwar history.

The decision reflected tactical considerations. The tide was turning in the Afghanistan fighting with victory looking more certain for the U.S.-led coalition. Although the German public was divided over the dispatch of troops, every poll showed a majority favored participation in the coalition. Both Mr. Schroeder and his party enjoyed high approval ratings, while the opposition Christian Democratic Party was in disarray and in no shape to contest early elections. The gamble paid off. Mr. Schroeder won the vote of confidence with two more votes than the absolute majority required. Only a single member of his party and four Greens voted against the measure.

Some credited (or blamed) politics for the outcome of the vote. They certainly contributed, but there were larger forces at work. Mr. Schroeder deserves credit for having understood the exceptional circumstances. As he said when explaining the rationale for the vote, "the country needs absolutely clear leadership at this time."

Mr. Schroeder was assisted, as in the past, by the moral clarity and force of his foreign minister, Mr. Joschka Fischer. Mr. Fischer, a member of the Greens, has emerged as a powerful voice in the government. Mr. Fischer was forthright, asking "the question this Parliament has to answer is, do we leave America on its own or not. Yes or no?" He had threatened to resign if his party did not back the government.

Germany has been well served by such individuals. They understood the critical issues at stake and, more importantly, were not afraid to address them directly. As Mr. Fischer noted, coalition partners have the right to question the U.S. strategy and tactics. German concerns — and they are similar to those of other nations such as Japan — about the proper balance between military and diplomatic actions should be voiced. But those objections must follow a more fundamental decision about where the country stands in the fight against terrorism.

Those concerns are healthy. They help ensure that Germany will not make the same mistakes that it did in the past. That is why leaders have an obligation to square off and make their respective cases. That is the foundation of democracy, for only when leaders engage in such debates can the public understand the issues and the stakes. Such thinking should prevail over protests that such direct confrontations are somehow alien to the culture. It is precisely the failure to confront such vitally important national issues that allows governments to lead their people astray. Mr. Schroeder has absorbed this lesson well. It is one that Japan is still learning.

The Japan Times: Dec. 12, 2001
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      同時多発テロ発生後、シュレーダー首相は米国との団結を表明し、対テロ支援は国際社会におけるドイツの増大する責任を果たすための心構えを示すものだと述べた。派兵は4,000人規模で、装備には巡視船、救護隊、核･化学･細菌兵器検知が可能な装甲車が含まれる。アラビア半島から中央アジアに1年間の予定で配備される軍隊は、地上戦にも空中戦にも参加しない。

      日本の連立与党の間でも意見の対立はあったが、シュレーダー首相と、独社民党左派と連立パートナーの緑の党との間の亀裂ほど深くはなかった。緑の党は軍事行動支援に抵抗した。8月に独政府は、マケドニアでのNATO平和維持活動への派兵の議会承認で野党に頼らざるを得ず、投票時に一部の与党議員が造反している。

      今回も同様の反対にあった首相は賭けに出て、派兵と自らの信任決議を合わせて議会の承認を求めることにした。これにはアフガン攻撃で多国籍軍の勝利が確実だったことが影響している。国民の大多数が多国籍軍への参加を支持していた。首相と与党が高い支持率を得ているのに対し、野党は混乱状態で、選挙では与党に対抗できそうになかった。賭けは効を奏し、首相は信任投票で絶対多数を2票上回る票を獲得した。

      シュレーダー氏は再び、フィッシャー外相の力と明確な倫理観に助けられた。緑の党党員である外相は議会に対し率直に、米国を支援するか否か答えるよう求め、緑の党が政権を支持しなければ辞職する決意を明らかにした。

      ドイツはそんな個人の力で支えられてきた。彼らは重大問題に真っ向から立ち向かうことを恐れない。確かに連立与党は米国の軍事作戦を批判する権利、軍事行動と外交のバランスへの懸念を表明する権利がある。しかしその反論に先立ち、反テロの闘いに関する国家の基本的方針を決定することが重要だ。前述の懸念はドイツが過去の過ちを繰り返さないために必要なものだ。だからこそ指導者は議論に際し自らの立場を明確にし、国民に何が重要な問題かを意識させる義務がある。それが民主主義の基盤であり、国家の問題に直面する努力を怠れば国民を迷わせてしまう。この教訓を肝に銘じているシュレーダー氏に日本は学ぶべきだろう。

The Japan Times Weekly
Dec. 22, 2001
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