For a new strategic calculus

新たな戦略上の計算

The United States is exhibit No. 1 when assessing the perils of myopia. President George W. Bush came to office promising a reassessment of his country's foreign policy agenda. His promise to deliver "leadership without arrogance" yielded a policy that rested on two pillars. The first was a reluctance to accept limits on U.S. freedom of action. The U.S. government showed a marked disdain for international initiatives — the Kyoto Protocol on climate control, the Biological Weapons Protocol — or any other constraint on U.S. room to maneuver, such as international law or the United Nations.

The second pillar was a refusal to get involved in distant conflicts that bore no immediate relationship to U.S. national interests. The U.S. under President Bush was not going to get involved in "nation building" exercises — Haiti, Kosovo, Bosnia — that the Clinton administration reluctantly embraced. U.S. resources — and especially those of its all powerful military — would not be stretched or wasted in far-off places that many Americans could not find on a map.

Both assumptions have been reassessed after Sept. 11. The U.S. rediscovered the importance of multilateralism as it built an international coalition to fight terror. In the process, it has come to recognize the significance of the U.N. and the need for its sanction when mobilizing forces. It has also begrudgingly accepted the importance of nation building. Unlike 1989, it will not declare victory in Afghanistan and go home. As Washington prepares for the next phase in the war against terror, the targets are those that topped the lists of "failed states."

In short, the U.S. appears to have learned the importance of enlightened self-interest: Washington is profoundly affected by developments in distant and seemingly unconnected parts of the globe. And while the American epiphany may be the most striking, this is a lesson that the entire world needs to absorb. We can no longer afford the illusion that there is a comfortable distance between "us" and "them." Cultures brush too easily against each other too often, and the friction is mounting.

While the rage that culminated in the attacks of Sept. 11 has many roots, the persistence of poverty and widening inequalities in the world are an important source of anger and disaffection. According to the U.N. Development Program, 2.8 billion people, or almost half the world's population, live on less than $2 a day. Worse, 1.2 billion live on less than $1 a day. The average income in the richest 20 countries is 37 times the average in the poorest 20, and that gap has doubled in the past 40 years. The number of children who die before reaching the age of 5 in poor countries is five times the number in high-income countries. In the developed world, less than 5 percent of children under 5 are malnourished; in poor countries, as many as 50 percent are hungry.

Rich nations make regular pledges to eradicate hunger, poverty and inadequate health care, yet the problems continue to grow. There is always money for more weapons; rarely are there funds for education or medical care. Priorities must change. It is estimated that $27 billion — 0.1 percent of the collective wealth of Japan, the U.S. and Europe — could save 8 million lives a year. Creating new economic opportunities for poor countries — the promise inherent in a new trade round — will help close the gap between rich nations and poor. Real debt relief for the poorest countries will also lift a crushing burden. Strengthening the role of international law and that of the U.N. will yield more reliable and enforceable standards for state behavior. When powerful nations choose to act as they wish, disregarding prevailing norms, all of international society suffers.

Governments have paid lip service to this notion of interconnectedness for generations. All the while, it has been belittled by hard-nosed realists who counsel that only military power and crisp calculations of economic cost and benefit can serve as the basis of state power and interests. The lesson of 2001 is that the intangibles matter. It is time to recalibrate the strategic calculus.

The Japan Times: Jan. 1, 2002
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      近視眼的考えが危険である証拠としてまず挙げるべきは米国だ。傲慢さのないリーダーシップというブッシュ大統領の公約は2つの柱に基づく政策を生んだ。1つめの柱は、京都議定書、国際法、国連などによる米国の行動の自由に対する制限を拒否する姿勢だ。2つめは、国益に直接関係のない遠隔地での紛争と｢国家建設｣への関与の拒否だ。

      9月11日以後、2つの前提は見直された。米国は国際社会との連携を通じ、多国間関係の重要性を再発見した。国連の意義と、武力行使に関する国連決議の必要性を認識し、国家建設の重要性も不承不承ながら認めるようになった。1989年当時とは違い、米国は今回アフガニスタンでの勝利を宣言して凱旋することはない。テロとの闘いの次の目標は｢崩壊した国家｣だろう。

      米国は国益にとって重要なものに突然目覚めた。これは世界の国々が学ぶべき教訓だ。｢我々｣と｢彼ら｣の間に距離があるという幻想を抱いてはいけない。文化間の摩擦は増大する一方だ。根絶できない貧困と広がる不平等は、怒りと不満を生む根源だ。国連開発計画によれば28億人が1日2ドル以下で、12億人が1ドル以下で生活しており、豊かな国と貧しい国の所得格差は近年拡大している。

      優先課題を変えなければならない。日米欧の資産の0.1%にあたる270億ドルで年に800万人の命を救うことができる。貧困国向けに経済的機会を創出することや債務救済が、貧富の差を縮める助けになる。国際法と国連の役割の強化により、信頼性がより高く、実施可能な国家行動の基準が生まれるだろう。 そんな国際協力は長年、各国政府の口先だけの賛成を得、軍事力と経済コストの計算だけが国家の力と利益を左右すると主張する現実主義者に軽んじられてきた。2001年の教訓は、無形のものも大切であるということだ。戦略上の計算を見直すべき時が来ている。

The Japan Times Weekly
Jan. 12, 2002
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