A 'Koizumi doctrine' for Asia

アジア外交構想：小泉ドクトリン

The speech, titled "Japan and ASEAN in East Asia," also envisions an "initiative for Japan-ASEAN comprehensive economic partnership" in a broad range of areas, including science and technology, education and tourism, as well as trade and investment. Mr. Koizumi also proposed a meeting on an "initiative for development in East Asia" to discuss aid strategies for the region.

Significantly, just the day before, he signed a free trade agreement with Singapore — the first time that Japan has concluded such an arrangement on a bilateral basis. He said the deal could be a model for similar cooperation with ASEAN states. Given that it effectively excludes agricultural products, however, it remains to be seen how free trade agreements will fit into the proposed scheme of Japan-ASEAN partnership.

Japan-ASEAN relations have both broadened and deepened since 1977, when the late Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda, Mr. Koizumi's political mentor, outlined his "Fukuda doctrine" in Manila, which called for "heart-to-heart" contacts between Japan and ASEAN. Following up on the Fukuda speech, Mr. Koizumi made it clear that Japan will take a more active economic role in the region, which is still recovering from the 1997 financial crisis. He also affirmed the nation's willingness to play a greater security role in East Asia following the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks on the United States.

Southeast Asia has undergone dramatic political and economic changes over the past quarter century that have greatly enhanced the region's international standing. In light of its rapid transformation, the Koizumi initiative seems long overdue. Perhaps Japan could have sent a similar message to the Southeast Asians — and matched its word with deeds — early on, were it not for the protracted domestic recession that made it "look inward." The Singapore speech should be the first step toward restructuring the nation's Southeast Asia diplomacy in the post-Sept. 11 period.

One of ASEAN's top priorities now is economic relations with China, which, having joined the World Trade Organization, is poised to become an economic superpower in the future. In November, the association and China agreed to conclude a free trade agreement in the next 10 years, despite, or rather because of, ASEAN's persistent concerns about the "Chinese threat." In this context, the Koizumi initiative reflects in part ASEAN's desire for Japan to serve as a counterweight to China. From the Japanese perspective, however, it is an attempt to bolster Tokyo's position in a vital region where Beijing has increased its influence in recent years. Either way, China is a key player waiting to take its place center stage.

In fact, China is regarded as a major partner not only in the comprehensive economic cooperation plan, but also in the existing ASEAN Plus Three (Japan, China and South Korea) and the ASEAN Regional Forum. Mindful of China's ascendancy, Mr. Koizumi also proposed the creation of a wider western Pacific community, including Australia and New Zealand. Implicit in all this is a desire to include China in the post-Sept. 11 political and security frameworks of East Asia and Southeast Asia.

But forging regional solidarity will be no easy task. For one thing, ASEAN states are beset by serious domestic problems, including the aftereffects of the financial turmoil of 1997. What they need most now is, perhaps, economic support from Japan, particularly increases in official development assistance, which Tokyo has decided to cut beginning in fiscal 2002. In this sense, the Koizumi proposal comes across as long on rhetoric and short on substance. Nevertheless, promises of financial aid are difficult to make at a time when Japan itself is hobbled by fiscal crisis. "Checkbook diplomacy" no longer works the way it used to.

Perhaps the most important thing missing in his otherwise forward-looking speech is a well-calibrated diplomatic compass that points to, among other things, the possibility of a cross-Pacific rivalry between the U.S. and China. The world is said to have left the post-Cold War period behind and entered a new age after Sept. 11. The world's security map now is blank, as it were. The same goes for East Asia and Southeast Asia. The test ahead for Mr. Koizumi and his foreign policy team is to flesh out his policy blueprint and establish a comprehensive diplomatic strategy.

The Japan Times: Jan. 16, 2002
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     1977年、故福田首相がマニラで発表した｢福田ドクトリン｣以来、日本とASEANの関係は深まってきた。小泉氏は、政治の恩師である福田氏の外交構想に続く形で、日本がアジアにおいて経済面でより積極的な役割を果たす意向を明らかにした。また、東アジアにおける安全保障面での役割の強化に対する意欲も示した。 　今回の小泉演説は、過去四半世紀の東南アジアの政治･経済両面での飛躍的な発展を考えれば遅きに失した感があるが、これは9月11日以後の日本の東南アジア外交政策再構築に向けた最初の一歩となるはずだ。

     ASEANの最優先事項は、将来の経済大国候補、中国との関係である。ASEANと中国は11月、今後10年間の自由貿易協定を結ぶことに合意したが、これは｢中国の脅威｣が原動力となっている。その意味で小泉氏の外交構想は、中国の対抗勢力としての日本に対するASEANの期待を反映しているといえよう。もっとも日本としては地域における地位向上という狙いがある。

     また小泉氏は中国の躍進を踏まえ、豪州、ニュージーランドを加えた西太平洋地域の拡大コミュニティ構築も提唱した。これらは全て、9月11日以後の東･東南アジアの政治及び安全保障の枠組みに中国を加えたいという希望の現われだ。しかし連帯強化は容易ではない。97年の経済危機の影響が残るASEAN諸国は深刻な国内問題を抱えている。今最も必要なのは日本の政府開発援助(ODA)の増額だろう。財政難の日本は2002年度からのODA予算削減を決めており、小泉氏の提案は言葉上はともかく実質面で不十分という印象を与える。

     小泉氏の演説に欠けていたもので最も重要なのは、米国と中国の対抗関係を見据えた効果的な外交政策だろう。世界が冷戦時代を経て9月11日以後の新しい時代に突入した今、安全保障の地図は固まっていない。小泉氏と外交チームにとっての今後の試練は、外交政策の詳細の具体化と、包括的な外交戦略の確立である。

The Japan Times Weekly
Jan. 26, 2002
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