The only viable choice

小泉首相の課題

In fact, his approval ratings have already sharply dropped in the latest media polls. Suddenly Mr. Koizumi is in a box. After all, public support is his best weapon against the opponents of his reforms. But he referred only briefly to Tanaka's dismissal and failed to give convincing reasons for that summary action. Instead, he acted as if the whole episode was a tempest in a teapot.

The timing was bad. Still, the prime minister could have halted, or at least slowed, the public's alienation had he spelled out a more credible reform agenda. The speech was lackluster for a leader who stakes his political fortune on reform in the midst of adversity. It did not convey much of a sense of crisis or urgency, despite his pledge to "advance reform with firm resolve."

The "Koizumi fever" that surrounded his "reform with no sacred cows" campaign appears to have suddenly evaporated. The prime minister emphasized that "structural reform is steadily making strides forward" and that 2002 will be the "year of reform in full bloom." But the majority of people are apparently not impressed, perhaps thinking that he is backing away from his commitments.

The speech skirted some of the things that people had most wanted to know about, such as the proposed privatization of highway corporations. Mr. Koizumi also kept them guessing over when patients' medical expenses would be raised. He faked them out, so to speak, at the very moment that his reform program is supposedly beginning to take shape.

Mr. Koizumi must be aware that the time for sloganeering is over and that he must begin to produce concrete results. Yet, contrary to his declared intent, he has created an impression that he is seeking to avoid hard decisions. Perhaps he wants to avert a clash with antireform forces in his Liberal Democratic Party. There is even a sense that he may be quietly setting the stage for a policy shift.

The party's old guard, emboldened by the prime minister's plunging popularity, may now take the offensive against him. That would be unfortunate. The reform campaign must be carried out, as he vowed, with renewed resolve. In particular, he must move decisively to meet the double threat of a deflationary spiral and a banking meltdown.

The Tanaka episode has also revealed a "conservative" streak in Prime Minister Koizumi in the traditional way in which he settled the row: by sacking all three key players without clarifying their responsibility. That is also part of the reason why his reform drive is seen as losing steam, and why stock prices, the yen's value and government bond prices have all dropped. A rush of "triple Japan selling," should it happen, could trigger a full-blown financial crisis.

The speech, moreover, included suggestions that could increase public anxiety. For instance, Mr. Koizumi stressed the need for emergency legislation to meet military crises directly involving Japan, but he didn't give any convincing explanations. He also emphasized the necessity for tax reform, hinting at the possibility of tax increases in the near future. At a time when the economy is struggling with its fourth recession in a decade, talk of tax hikes is premature, to say the least.

The most fundamental flaw in his speech is its failure to show a road map for the new Japan that the prime minister claims his reforms can build. Indeed, the big problem with his reform agenda is that it has always been rich in rhetoric but poor in substance. It is not clear, for example, how much-touted "safety nets" for the socially disadvantaged, such as jobless people, will fit into long-term recovery plans. The same thing can be said of job-sharing plans.

It remains to be seen whether the steep fall in Mr. Koizumi's popularity ratings is temporary or not. The numbers are still around the average level that his predecessors recorded halfway through their tenures. He may be able to recoup some if not all of his losses if he forges ahead with his crusade to rebuild the nation. The starting point for him is to recognize a stark reality: that he no longer enjoys the stratospheric popularity he enjoyed before last week's "Tuesday massacre."

Mr. Koizumi would do well to remember the dictum every democratic leader ought to keep in mind: Do not act without the public's trust. This means that his options are limited. Basically, the only viable choice he can take is to steadfastly carry out his reforms by defeating the forces that resist change.

The Japan Times: Feb. 6, 2002
(C) All rights reserved

     「聖域なき構造改革」をめぐる小泉フィーバーは突如として冷めた。首相は2002年が改革本番の年だと強調したが、大多数の人は首相の改革への決意が鈍ったとみてか、演説を評価しなかったようだ。演説は道路公団の民営化など、国民が最も知りたい問題を避けた。

     首相は、スローガン作りでなく具体的な成果を上げ始める時期にきていることを認識すべきだ。自民党の守旧派が支持率低下につけこんで攻撃に出る可能性があるが、改革は約束どおり、新たな決意で実行せねばならない。特にデフレスパイラルと金融危機という二重の脅威に対する果敢な決断が必要だ。

     田中外相の件では3人の中心人物を、責任の所在を明確にしないまま罷免したことで、首相の保守的な側面が明らかになった。これも改革への勢いが鈍ったと見られている理由であり、株価、円相場、国債が下落した理由でもある。これら三つの「日本売り」が続けば本格的な金融危機を招きかねない。

     今回の演説には国民の不安を増大させる要素も含まれていた。首相は有事法制の必要性を強調しつつ十分な説明をしなかった。税制改革の必要性を力説し、近い将来の増税をほのめかした。

     首相の演説の決定的な欠点は、改革後の新生日本に向けた道筋を示せなかったことだ。首相の唱える改革の予定表は、言葉の上では立派でも中身に乏しい。失業者など社会的弱者向けのセーフティネットにしてもワークシェアリング制度にしても、長期回復計画にどのように組み込むのか明確にしなかった。

     小泉氏はまず、「火曜日の大更迭」以前の高支持率は取り戻せないという厳しい現実を直視すべきだ。「国民の信頼なしに行動するな」という民主国家の指導者が守るべき原則を心に留めておくとよいだろう。氏にとって現実的な唯一の選択肢は、抵抗勢力を打ち負かすことで構造改革を断行することだ。

The Japan Times Weekly
Feb. 16, 2002
(C) All rights reserved