Shady politico-bureaucratic ties

相変わらずの政官癒着構造

Here is an elected official climbing the ladder of power by arranging pork-barrel projects for companies in his constituency. Here are civil servants bending the rules of administration with political influence as the lever. The public interest is all but ignored. That is nothing new, as evidenced by past corruption scandals involving politicians and bureaucrats. The surprise is that this has happened in the Foreign Ministry.

According to the report, Mr. Suzuki, as deputy chief Cabinet secretary in 1999, intervened in a construction project for a public lodging facility on Kunashiri Island, one of the Russian-held islands known as the Northern Territories. He requested that the ministry invite tenders only from companies in Hokkaido's Nemuro district, his constituency. The ministry then decided to limit eligible bidders to "those who have building experience in Nemuro." The decision was made in consultation with the Assistance Committee, the implementing body for aid projects in the Northern Territories.

The report concludes that "Mr. Suzuki involved himself deeply in determining bidding qualifications." And in unusually strong language it states: "It is abnormal for a member of the Diet to get involved with such details by using his influence. This is impermissible in light of commonly accepted norms."

The report stops short of saying whether Mr. Suzuki put "undue pressure" on the ministry or whether he did anything legally wrong. It is clear, however, that he used political leverage in the selection of bidders. Therefore, it is easy to imagine that his real aim was to secure pork-barrel funds for business interests in his constituency. At the very least, he exceeded the bounds of prudence as a Diet member and a Cabinet official.

Mr. Suzuki was also closely involved in choosing bidders for a port repair project on Kunashiri. At the same time, the report points an accusing finger at the ministry itself, saying: "There was a kind of atmosphere in the ministry that made it compelling to respect and realize (Mr. Suzuki's intentions) in exceptional ways." The implication is that such a "give and take" relationship between Mr. Suzuki and the Foreign Ministry was "structural" — and continued almost on a routine basis. The scandal unfolding is most likely the tip of an iceberg.

The investigation leaves many questions unanswered. That may be unavoidable, not only because it was an in-house probe with no legal force but also because it was conducted in a relatively short period of time. The report is only a milestone, not a destination, in a continuing probe by the ministry. It is also necessary to take prompt action against bureaucrats involved and to establish a strict code of conduct.

The Diet, of course, should conduct its own investigation. In a recent appearance as an unsworn witness, Mr. Suzuki flatly denied his involvement in the construction of the "Friendship House" on Kunashiri. But the report's finding clearly contradicts his statement. With Mr. Suzuki ready to appear again, this time under oath, the Diet should find out exactly what he did, or did not do.

What is most disturbing about the Suzuki scandal is that it may point to a wider structure of collusion. There is ample evidence to suggest that this is a symptom of an entrenched disease that affects the relationship between the LDP and the bureaucracy in general.

Except for a brief period in the early 1990s, the LDP has been in power for decades. True, the age of one-party rule ended in 1993 with the advent of a non-LDP coalition government. What's more, the introduction of a new electoral system — a combination of single-seat districts and proportional representation — supposedly created better conditions for policy-oriented campaigning. But the cozy relationship between the LDP and the bureaucracy has remained basically unchanged. It is even likely that the creation of small districts has driven Lower House members to pay closer attention to their constituencies, spawning more corruption in the process.

The Suzuki affair has raised the old question anew: What needs to be done to correct the shady relationship between legislators and bureaucrats? It is certainly not enough to cry for "elimination of undue pressure" and "proper decision-making." These appeals must be translated into concrete measures, including legal regulations.

The Japan Times: March 6, 2002
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     1999年当時内閣官房副長官を務めていた鈴木氏は、国後島の宿泊施設｢友好の家｣建設工事の入札に干渉し、入札参加を自分の選挙区である根室管区の企業に限るよう外務省に要請した。外務省は入札参加資格を｢根室での工事実績がある企業｣に限定することを決定した。

     報告書は｢鈴木議員は入札企業の決定に深く関与した｣と結論づけ、国会議員によるこれほどの関与は異常であり「社会通念に照らして許されない」と述べている。報告書は鈴木氏が外務省に不当な圧力をかけたか、または違法行為をしたかについては触れなかった。しかし入札企業選定にあたり政治的影響力を及ぼしたことは明らかで、氏の目的が地元選挙区の企業を利する資金の確保であったことは容易に想像がつく。氏は国会議員としての良識の範囲を越えた。

     鈴木氏は国後島の桟橋改修工事の入札企業選定にも深く関わった。報告書は、鈴木氏の意図を尊重し実現せざるを得ないような雰囲気が外務省内にあったとしている。これは両者のギブ･アンド･テイクの関係が構造的なもので、日常茶飯事に近かったことを示唆している。今回の調査は省内で短期間に行われたため多くの疑問が解明されないまま残ったが、報告書は今後も続く調査の通過点でしかない。

     今回の疑惑で癒着の構造が定着していることが伺える。自民党は90年代初頭を除き、長い間与党として君臨してきた。93年に非自民連立政権が誕生して単独政権時代が終わり、小選挙区制と比例代表制の導入で政策志向の選挙戦の条件作りがなされたはずだが、自民党と官僚の馴れ合い関係は変わらなかった。小選挙区制で選挙区への議員の関心が高まり、汚職が広がった可能性さえある。

     議員と官僚の癒着を正すにはどうすればいいか。鈴木氏の疑惑は古くて新しい問題提起をした。不当な圧力の排除や適切な意思決定を求めるだけでは十分ではない。法の整備など、具体的な施策が必要なのだ。

The Japan Times Weekly
March 16, 2002
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