A reckless pronuclear comment

非核三原則見直し発言

The remark, initially attributed to a "senior government official," betrayed a disturbing lack of political discretion. No wonder it has cast doubt, at home and abroad, over Japan's bedrock commitment to the nonproliferation and elimination of nuclear weapons. However, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi reacted almost nonchalantly to Mr. Fukuda's "slip of the tongue," brushing it off as "nothing serious."

The potentially explosive comment came first during a background briefing on Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe's speech in Tokyo last month in which, according to reports, he said possession of atomic bombs would not present constitutional problems. Elaborating on Mr. Abe's remark, Mr. Fukuda said that "in legal theory" Japan could have intercontinental ballistic missiles and atomic bombs, and that the three nonnuclear principles might change if the people believed Japan should go nuclear.

These principles, of course, define the security policy of Japan, the world's first and only nation to experience atomic bombings. They were formulated by the government in 1967 and adopted by the Diet in 1971, when the United States returned Okinawa to Japanese control with assurances that U.S. military bases there had no nuclear weapons.

This three-point nonnuclear pledge was tested severely in times of high international tension, particularly during the height of the Cold War. It was criticized here as "2 1/2 principles," meaning "half-compliance" with the principle of not introducing nuclear weapons. The implication was, and still is, that, government denials notwithstanding, U.S. warships visiting Japanese ports might be carrying nuclear weapons.

But the fundamental value of these principles and the unique position of Japan as the nonnuclear champion were firmly upheld at all times. Indeed, the "three nuclear don'ts" represent a universal aspiration of humanity, our common desire for a nuclear-free world. There is no inevitable reason to change these principles.

The terrorist attacks of Sept. 11 came as a shocking reminder of the instabilities in the post-Cold War world. But the world as a whole is clearly moving toward cooperation, not confrontation. The trend of nuclear disarmament is here to stay, as evidenced by a recent U.S.-Russian agreement limiting their nuclear arsenals. For Japan, the nuclear option is simply out of the question.

The debate on a possible constitutional revision has been picking up some momentum of late. The trend is toward increasing Japan's security role at home and abroad, but there is no explicit opinion in favor of nuclear arming. It may be theoretically possible to possess nuclear arms, but politically and morally the nuclear route is a nonstarter.

Why, then, did Mr. Fukuda make such a careless remark? He told a press conference that he had only mentioned a "legal theory" and that the government is committed as firmly as ever to the nonnuclear policy. Still, many Japanese must be wondering whether he made his "faux pas" by design.

Despite Mr. Fukuda's clarification, the remark has provoked public suspicion that behind-the-scenes attempts to reverse the nonnuclear policy may be under way somewhere within the government and the Liberal Democratic Party. Skeptics point out that the Koizumi administration is supported by an LDP faction originating from a former alliance of party hawks.

The Fukuda comment could not have come at a worse time. In the Diet, tension is running high over defense-contingency bills and other controversial measures as the ruling and opposition parties brace for an extended session beyond June 19. Internationally, the renewed military face-off between India and Pakistan is raising the specter of a nuclear war. Japan's relations with its Asian neighbors, particularly China and South Korea, are still haunted by ghosts of the past.

In what amounted to a virtual retraction of his remark, Mr. Fukuda stated in the Diet on Thursday that, under the Atomic Energy Basic Law, Japan can utilize nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes. Mr. Fukuda's matter-of-fact change of view is not enough to dispel public suspicion. This would be a good time for the government to reaffirm the three nonnuclear principles in clear-cut language and restore a full measure of public trust in them.

The Japan Times: June 7, 2002
(C) All rights reserved

      問題の発言は、安倍官房副長官が先月の講演で「核兵器の使用は憲法上問題ない」と述べたことに関し、福田官房長官が記者会見で説明した際のコメントだ。日本は「法理論的には」大陸間弾道ミサイルや原爆を保有できるという。

      非核三原則は、唯一の被爆国日本の安全保障政策の要で、冷戦時代の試練に耐えてきた。日本に寄港する米国艦船が核兵器を搭載している可能性から「2と1/2 原則」と批判されたが、三原則の価値と、非核主義の主唱者としての日本の独自の立場は保たれてきた。核のない世界という人類共通の願望を表すこの三原則を変える必然性はない。

      同時多発テロは冷戦後の世界の不安定さを衝撃的な形で見せつけた。しかし最近の米ロ間の核兵器削減合意が示すように、世界は核軍縮の傾向にあり、日本の核保有は理論的には可能でも、政治的、道徳的に見れば考慮に値しない。

      では福田氏はなぜあんな不用意な発言をしたのか。氏は、法理論上はともかく非核政策に対する政府の決意は固いと述べたが、発言は意図的なものではないか、非核三原則を覆すため政権内で裏工作が行われていないかと、国民の多くが疑っている。今回の発言のタイミングは最悪だ。国会では有事関連法案等をめぐる論争が起こり、印パ間の緊張は核戦争の恐怖をつきつけた。日本と近隣諸国との関係にはいまだに戦争が影を落としている。

      福田氏は後に発言を撤回し、原子力エネルギー基本法によれば原子力は平和目的以外には利用できないと述べた。しかし発言を翻しただけでは国民の不安は払拭されない。政府にとって今こそ、非核三原則を明確な言葉で再確認し、原則に対する国民の信頼を回復する良いチャンスだろう。

The Japan Times Weekly
June 15, 2002
(C) All rights reserved