A breakthrough in Pyongyang

日朝国交正常化へ大きな一歩

The road to reconciliation will be tortuous. The minimum necessary condition is that North Korea never again commit similar acts of inhumanity against Japanese citizens. The challenge for Japan is to conduct a broader range of diplomatic activities to help promote regional interests in and around the Korean Peninsula.

The abductions took place "in the course of abnormal Japan-North Korea relations," as the Pyongyang declaration states. More specifically, the incidents resulted from North Korea's Cold War strategy that placed heavy emphasis on the military. In fact, many South Koreans are also listed as "missing," allegedly because of state-sponsored terrorism in that era.

North Korea has pledged to prevent the recurrence of "regrettable problems," meaning not only abductions but also intrusions of spy ships into Japanese waters. The test for Pyongyang is to match words with deeds. It has yet to convince the Japanese, as well as the Americans and the South Koreans, that it is really seeking peace.

At the inter-Korean summit held in Pyongyang in 2000, Mr. Kim promised to make a return visit to Seoul. He has yet to deliver on that promise. It is heartening, though, that the two Koreas have just started work to reconstruct their disconnected rail and road links — a joint project that also involves removal of land mines in the demilitarized zone that divides the peninsula. With the North Korean military beginning to take a forward-looking stance, it is hoped that more confidence-building measures will be taken after South Korea elects its new leader in December's presidential election.

It is unclear at the moment how the United States will act toward North Korea. Immediately after taking office, President George W. Bush expressed his dislike of Mr. Kim's regime, throwing cold water on South Korean President Kim Dae Jung's "sunshine policy" of engagement. In June last year, the Bush administration indicated a willingness to seek dialogue through continuation of the Agreed Framework, for example — but its hardline position seems basically unchanged.

For the U.S., now preoccupied with a possible attack on Iraq, North Korea is not a nation of immediate priority. Still, preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction remains the central aim of U.S. diplomacy. In the Pyongyang declaration, North Korea pledged to continue its moratorium on missile launches beyond 2003 and to abide by all "international agreements," possibly including international nuclear inspections. In Washington's eye, however, these commitments may not be sufficient to warrant a resumption of dialogue.

For North Korea, which faces serious economic difficulties, the highest priority, it seems, is to maintain the current regime. The inter-Korean summit provided Pyongyang de facto assurance that the South would not seek the collapse of the North. Pyongyang must be hoping that normalized ties with Japan will further assure continuance of its regime.

With regard to the U.S., however, North Korea is probably driven more by fears of what the Bush administration hopes for. Washington has denied any intention of pursuing a "regime change" in Pyongyang, as it is in Baghdad, but has accused it of producing refugees, sponsoring international terrorism and exporting weapons of mass destruction, branding it a member of an "axis of evil."

Making North Korea a responsible member of the international community will require close cooperation among Japan, the U.S. and South Korea. Japan and South Korea need to articulate Asia's regional interests to the U.S. and forestall any unilateral U.S. action. For that, it is also necessary to create bilateral and multilateral frameworks for security consultations, including talks between Japanese and North Korean defense officials.

As for Japanese economic aid to North Korea, a key issue in the normalization talks, Japan needs to take into account the intentions of China and Russia as well. The two nations, while welcoming an improvement in Japan-North Korea relations, are not in a position to offer substantial aid. There is also a need to convince the U.S. that financial assistance to North Korea will not lead to an arms buildup in that country, but instead lay the foundation for post-Cold War stability in Northeast Asia.

The Japan Times: September 20, 2002
(C) All rights reserved

      和解への道は厳しく、北朝鮮が日本人に対し人道に反する行為を二度と行わないことが最低条件となる。日本には、朝鮮半島の関係諸国の利益のため広範な外交努力が求められる。

      北朝鮮の冷戦軍事戦略の結果起きた拉致問題は「日朝が不正常な関係にある中で生じた」と平壌宣言は述べている。北朝鮮は、拉致及び工作船の領海侵犯を含む「遺憾な問題」の再発防止を約束した。この国の言行一致が試される。

      米国が北朝鮮に対しいかに対処するかは不明だ。ブッシュ大統領は就任早々北朝鮮への敵意を表明した。昨年6月、米国は米朝枠組み合意の継続など北朝鮮との協議を再開する用意があることを明らかにしたが、その強硬路線に変化はない。

      米国の最大の関心事はイラク攻撃だが、外交の焦点は大量破壊兵器の拡散防止である。平壌宣言で北朝鮮は、ミサイル発射凍結を2003年以降にまで延長し、国際的合意の順守を約束したが、米国にすればそれだけでは対話再開には不十分かもしれない。

      北朝鮮は、日本との関係改善を通じて体制存続を確実にしたいと望んでいるようだが、同時にブッシュ政権の意図を恐れていると思われる。

      北朝鮮を国際社会に参加させるためには日米韓の協力が不可欠である。日韓は米国に地域の利害関係を明確に伝えて米国の単独行動を防ぐべきだ。日朝の防衛関係者間の対話を含む安全保障協議の枠組みが必要になる。

      北朝鮮への経済援助にあたり、日本は中国とロシアの意向を考慮に入れねばならない。また援助が軍備増強でなく、冷戦後の北東アジア地域安定の基盤作りに使われることを米国に納得させる必要がある。

The Japan Times Weekly
September 28, 2002
(C) All rights reserved