The SDF and the Constitution

自衛隊は憲法を順守せよ

The SDF has evolved significantly during the past half century, reflecting changes in domestic and international situations. The 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States have transformed the security environment in the post-Cold War world. That has posed a critical question for Japan: What kind of defense capability should the SDF develop?

The annual report addresses this question on the basis of discussions conducted by an internal study group. It makes two key points: The first is that the SDF should improve its capability to deal with "new threats," such as weapons of mass destruction, missiles, guerrillas and international terrorists. The underlying belief is that there is only a small possibility that Japan will be attacked in a conventional way.

The second point is that the SDF should take a more positive role in international peacekeeping activities. Japan has sent troops on non-combat missions abroad since 1992, when the Diet passed the legislation that opened the way for SDF participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations. These missions, the report says, have received "a full measure of public understanding and expectations, and represent a major type of the SDF's activities."

In other words, the SDF's roles have shifted in emphasis to meeting new security threats and to conducting international peacekeeping activities. It is true that this is accepted in principle by the Japanese public. At the same time, though, an assortment of problems present themselves when it comes to specifics.

The overriding need is to maintain coherence with the constitutional provisions and principles that renounce the use of force as means of settling international disputes. It is essential to follow the established guidelines of defense policy, such as the principle of exclusive self-defense — which says in effect that Japan will take defensive action only in the event of a direct attack.

The "new threats" may be more difficult to predict and more difficult to deal with than the conventional ones, but this cannot be used as an excuse for scrapping the principle of exclusive defense or for allowing "pre-emptive" strikes. These possibilities are reportedly being considered by some in the government and the governing parties.

The United States was unable to prevent the 9/11 attacks despite its military might. It is unlikely that even the best-laid out missile defense plan will be able to detect or block sneak assaults such as a suicide bombing using a hijacked jetliner.

The lesson is that military action has its limits. Instead of single-mindedly improving military responses to real or perceived threats, efforts must be made to attack underlying problems like poverty and to prevent conflicts through comprehensive programs, including disarmament and confidence-building measures.

Caution is required in expanding the SDF's international activities. The government believes that the existing legal framework for overseas SDF deployment — consisting mainly of the PKO cooperation law as well as the ad hoc anti-terrorism and the Iraq reconstruction support laws — needs updating. To that end, it is preparing to establish permanent catch-all legislation.

Activities under the PKO law meet clear-cut conditions such as the existence of a cease-fire agreement between warring parties and the consent of the country involved. By contrast, support for U.S.-led military operations not explicitly authorized by the United Nations can raise the question of legitimacy. Moreover, deployment in a potential combat zone could lead to the use of force prohibited by the Constitution.

Therefore, severe conditions must be attached to SDF activities abroad. The last thing Japan should want is to expand the scope and nature of deployment in an unprincipled manner in the name of "international contributions" or "the Japan-U.S. alliance." The SDF needs to be upgraded in line with reality, but, first and foremost, the SDF must be one that meets the basic tenets of the Constitution.

The Japan Times Weekly
Aug. 16, 2003
(C) All rights reserved

      この半世紀で内外情勢は大きく変わった。特に2001年9月11日の米同時多発テロは冷戦後の安全保障環境を変質させた。白書は今後の自衛隊の問題として次の二点を挙げている。

      第一、大量破壊兵器、ミサイル、ゲリラ、国際テロなどの「新たな脅威」への対応能力を向上する必要がある。日本が航空機や艦船を動員した従来の通常型大規模侵略を受ける可能性は低い。

      第二、自衛隊は平和維持活動に積極的に取り組むべきだ。1992年の国連平和維持活動（PKO）協力法制定以来、自衛隊の海外活動は国民に十分理解されている。

      自衛隊のありかたで最も大事なのは、国際紛争解決を目的とした武力行使の放棄を定めた憲法や、攻撃を受けて初めて防衛力を行使する専守防衛原則などの防衛政策の基本から逸脱しないことだ。

      同時多発テロのような事件は、脅威への軍事的対応能力の強化だけでは防止できない。対立の根底にある貧困、格差などの問題解決や、軍縮、信頼醸成努力を含めた総合的な取り組みが必要だ。

      自衛隊の国際的な役割拡大については、慎重にすべきだ。政府は自衛隊の海外派遣についてはPKO協力法や特別立法だけでは対応できなくなったとして、恒久法制定の準備をしている。

      だがPKO協力と違い、米国主導の軍事行動への支援に参加する場合、その正当性が問題となる。戦闘地域・非戦闘地域が定かでない状況で出動すれば、自衛隊が攻撃され、憲法で禁止されている武力行使の問題を引き起こす可能性も出てくる。

      「国際貢献」や「日米同盟重視」の名の下に、自衛隊の派遣を無原則に拡大してはならない。自衛隊は時代の要求にかなうと同時に、憲法の規定を護らねばならない。