Keeping to the PKO principles

スーダン自衛隊派遣の是非

    Government officials stress that Japan should respond positively to the request, given its declared commitment to international peace and security. It should respond carefully, though, by examining roles to be played by the SDF, as well as security and other conditions on the ground. A hasty deployment decision should be avoided.

    Legislation authorizing SDF participation in PKO activities was enacted in 1992 following the Persian Gulf War. Later in the same year, Japan dispatched a 1,200-strong engineering unit to the U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia. So far the SDF has participated in eight PKO missions.

    Japan's PKO activities have been favorably received here and abroad. In a poll taken by the Cabinet Office in 2002, 76 percent of the respondents said such cooperation should be provided at current levels or in more active ways. And in a Foreign Ministry poll conducted the same year in six Southeast Asian nations, "maintenance of peace" topped the list of contributions expected of Japan, followed by "economic and technical cooperation" and "promotion of trade and private investment."

    The PKO Cooperation Law attaches severe conditions to the dispatch of SDF troops. These conditions, known as "the five principles of PKO participation," include the conclusion of a cease-fire agreement between warring parties, acceptance of peacekeepers by the parties and adherence to strict neutrality. Moreover, a freeze was initially imposed on participation in the primary activities of a peacekeeping force, such as the patrolling of buffer zones and the disposal of abandoned weapons.

    The freeze was lifted in December 2001 as a result of a revision to the PKO legislation that relaxed the rules for weapons use by SDF troops. That revision has expanded the SDF's roles overseas, but has increased the possibility of its getting involved in unforeseen situations.

    In southern Sudan, civil war had continued since 1983 between government forces and the Sudan People's Liberation Army against a background of conflicts between Arab and black residents and disputes over oil concessions. Reports put the total number of victims at about 2 million.

    On Jan. 9, the warring parties reached a peace agreement. Under the accord, residents in the south are to decide in a referendum, following six years of rule under an interim government, whether to maintain the federal system or become independent. The U.N. Security Council is expected to pass a specific resolution authorizing the peacekeeping mission, perhaps by the end of this month.

    The signing of a peace agreement and the start of an interim administration seem to satisfy the five principles. However, there remain a number of concerns. First, there is a deep undercurrent of resentment in the south, inhabited largely by Christian and animist blacks, against the government in the north, dominated by Arabic Muslims. Darfur in western Sudan is embroiled in an escalating conflict between the Khartoum government and a different rebel group. Native residents in the east are mounting an anti-government campaign to seek greater autonomy.

    According to the five principles, SDF troops would have to pull out immediately should the cease-fire agreement break down. In reality, though, withdrawing troops ahead of schedule is difficult once they are deployed. At the least, immediate participation in PKF activities should be avoided. PKO activities like repairing roads require careful decisions that take into account Sudan's domestic situation.

    It may be that the government, anxious to gain a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council, is trying to improve its record on international contributions. But troops are not dispatched abroad out of diplomatic consideration alone.

The Japan Times Weekly
Feb. 19, 2005
(C) All rights reserved

      日本は国際平和と安全保障に貢献するため積極的に要請に応じるべきだ、と政府関係者は主張するが、自衛隊の役割、現地の治安情勢などを念頭に慎重に検討すべきだ。派遣決定は急ぐべきではない。

      日本は湾岸戦争後成立したPKO協力法の下でこれまでに8回、自衛隊を海外派遣している。この法律は、日本のPKO参加について、停戦の合意、受入国の同意などの5原則を定めている。当初、緩衝地帯の哨戒、放棄された武器の処分などの主要任務についての参加は凍結されていたが、01年12月の法改正で凍結は解除された。

      スーダン政府と反政府勢力は1月9日、和平合意に署名した。今後6年間の暫定政府による統治を経て南部で住民投票を実施し、全国の連邦制を維持するか、南部が独立するかを決める。

      和平合意と暫定政権発足は、日本のPKO参加5原則の条件を満たすが、問題も残っている。キリスト教徒や黒人の多い南部住民は、アラブ系イスラム教徒の多い北部の政府に対し強い反感を持っている。西部のダルフールばかりでなく、東部でも反政府活動が盛んである。

      5原則によれば、停戦合意が破られれば、自衛隊は直ちに撤退せねばならない。しかし一旦展開した部隊を、予定を繰り上げて撤退させるのは困難である。少なくとも、平和維持軍への即時参加は避けるべきだ。道路修理などの平和維持活動に対する参加については、スーダンの国内情勢を考慮して慎重に判断すべきである。

      政府は国連安保理の常任理事国入りを目指して国際貢献を推進したいところだろうが、自衛隊の海外派遣は、外交戦略だけでするものではない。