Missile defense and civilian control

ミサイル防衛と文民統制

    In December 2003, the government decided to introduce the anti-missile system to deal effectively with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. Deployment of the system — a salient feature of the new Defense Program Outline — is planned for fiscal 2006.

    A missile fired by North Korea would reach Japan in 10 minutes. Since there would be too little time for the Japanese Security Council or the Cabinet to meet and decide what to do, it is necessary, the argument goes, to have an effective missile-interception system and to establish ad hoc operating procedures for such an emergency.

    There is concern, however, that omitting the usual intragovernment procedures could weaken civilian control of the military. The government should do its utmost to ensure that this does not happen. The necessary measures should be explained by either Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi or Defense Agency Director General Yoshinori Ono, or both.

    Under the SDF Law, action to intercept an incoming missile is to begin with the issuance of a defense mobilization order. But issuing such an order is considered impractical because of the time it would take. The revision bill takes into account two cases in which incoming missiles would be intercepted without defense mobilization orders:

    In Case 1, a missile attack is deemed imminent amid signs of immediate launch preparations, such as fuel injection. The director general of the Defense Agency informs the prime minister of the nation's deployment of missile-defense forces, including missile-mounted Aegis destroyers. Following a Cabinet decision, the prime minister gives the director general the authority to intercept the missile. After a missile is fired, the military commander in charge, acting on orders from the defense chief, gives the go-ahead for interception.

    In Case 2, a hostile missile is fired with no prior signs of launch preparations. In such an emergency, the missile can be intercepted without the approval of the prime minister — that is, without a Cabinet decision. Orders by the Defense Agency director general would have been given in advance under the "guidelines for emergency response."

    In both cases, the decision to fire an interceptor missile would be made by the field commander. In Case 2, where the prime minister's decision is skipped, the question is whether the principle of civilian control will be maintained.

    The government is trying to ensure a rapid response to an emergency and the maintenance of civilian control by establishing detailed emergency guidelines, including procedures for radar detection as well as missile destruction, rules describing the MD unit's execution of the director general's orders, the scope of the MD unit's activities, and methods of communicating with concerned administrative bodies.

    These guidelines, which have yet to be prepared, should be laid out in the SDF Law as much as possible, not in Cabinet orders that would give the Defense Agency discretionary authority. Additionally, orders issued by the director general to the field commander under the guidelines should be subject to ex post facto review.

    The MD system is designed to operate in two stages. In the first stage, an interceptor missile is launched by an Aegis ship to destroy an incoming missile in outer space several minutes after launch. In the second stage, if the interceptor fails, a ground-based Patriot missile is launched to destroy the hostile missile in the atmosphere.

    The Aegis destroyer and the Patriot missile unit are led by officers equivalent in rank to commander and lieutenant colonel, respectively.

    Although these officers are well-trained, the weight of their responsibility for judging whether to fire an interceptor must be recognized. The revision bill, reflecting the view of the New Komeito party, the partner in the governing coalition, would require the government to submit a report to the Diet immediately after interception. This is a necessary step to ensure civilian control.

    Incidentally, the U.S. Defense Department's recent flight test of a ground-based interceptor missile failed. The Japanese government says the U.S. anti-missile system is different from the short-range interceptor system Japan plans to introduce. Yet the Japanese system is extraordinarily expensive. It is essential, therefore, to constantly examine its costs and benefits.

The Japan Times Weekly
Feb. 26, 2005
(C) All rights reserved

      03年12月、政府は大量破壊兵器と弾道ミサイルの拡散に対応するため、MDシステムの導入を決定した。システムの配備は新防衛計画大綱に盛り込まれており、06年度に予定されている。

      北朝鮮によって発射されたミサイルは日本に10分で到達するという。発射後に政府の安全保障会議や内閣が対策を協議する時間はない。

      そこで、効果的MDシステムを導入し、緊急事態の対応策を定めることが必要になるが、通常の政府内協議を省けば、自衛隊に対する文民統制を弱めるおそれがある。

      現行自衛隊法の下で、ミサイル迎撃は防衛出動の発令で可能になるが、発令に時間がかかり実際的でない。そこで、発令なしに迎撃を可能にする弾道ミサイル破壊措置が自衛隊法改正法案に盛り込まれた。同法案は次の2段階での迎撃を想定している。

      （1）敵ミサイルが日本領域に飛来する恐れがある場合は、防衛庁長官が閣議決定、首相の事前承認を得て自衛隊に迎撃を命令する。（2）前兆なしに敵ミサイルが発射され、首相の承認を得る時間のない場合は、事前に定められた緊急対処要領に基づく防衛庁長官の命令で迎撃が実行される。

      どちらの場合も、迎撃ミサイル発射の決定は部隊指揮官によってなされるが、（2）では文民統制の問題が起きる。

      ミサイルの探知、破壊、関係部隊による防衛庁長官命令の実行などについての緊急対応指針は、自衛隊に裁量権を与える形でなく、自衛隊法に含められるべきだ。

      MDシステムではまず、敵のミサイルを宇宙空間で破壊するため、迎撃ミサイルがイージス艦から発射される。迎撃が失敗すると、大気圏中で敵ミサイルを破壊するため、地上からパトリオットミサイルが発射される。

      公明党の要求で、法案は政府にミサイル迎撃後直ちに国会に報告することを義務づけている。文民統制上、必要な措置だ。

      最近行なわれた米国のMDシステムの発射実験は失敗に終わった。日本が導入する短距離迎撃システムは米国のシステムと違うといわれるが、非常に高価である。その費用対効果を十分研究すべきである。