Road to corporate turnaround

産業再生機構の今後の課題

    If some of those loans decline in value by the time the agency is dissolved, the losses are to be covered by the agency, which is partly funded by the government. In other words, the bill will be passed on to taxpayers. The IRCJ, which started out with a buyback fund of ¥10 trillion, has so far spent about ¥1 trillion purchasing loans and supplying capital.

    The IRCJ is right to try to avoid losses by selling the loans at higher prices than at what it bought them from creditor banks. Given tight market conditions, though, the agency's ability to turn profits will be tested. At the very least, it should try to minimize the taxpayers' burden.

    In its first two years of operation, the agency did a fairly good job: It selected up to 41 businesses for assistance, including household names such as the Daiei supermarket chain, cosmetics maker Kanebo, and Dai- kyo the condominium builder. This action raised its profile as a corporate turnaround agency.

    The list includes small and medium-size businesses, such as Matsu- yadenki (electric equipment) and a range of regional companies, including Kyushu Sangyo Kotsu (transport) in Kumamoto Prefecture, Usui department stores in Fukushima Prefecture, Skynet Asia Airways in Miyazaki Prefecture, and the Kinugawa Grand Hotel in Tochigi Prefecture.

    The IRCJ has succeeded in turning around eight companies. It says other revival programs are "proceeding steadily," suggesting that it has not incurred any losses to date. The question that remains is whether it will be able to rebuild other companies without causing losses.

    Success may not be assured in every case. Most of the companies that sought the agency's help had one problem in common: a large amount of non-performing loans. They could have shed those loans rather quickly through bankruptcy filings, but such a drastic measure would have done serious damage to the regional economies that depended heavily on their presence. So they chose a less damaging method: "soft landing" with a public bailout.

    Creditor banks, meanwhile, are playing a more positive role in the IRCJ's revival programs. They are willing to accept debt waivers for their beleaguered clients — a painful option that they initially refused to take. Indeed, there appears to be growing realization among regional lenders that they must share the pain with distressed clients. Some banks are keen to learn turnaround knowhow from the agency.

    Still, finding business partners for ailing companies won't be easy. Large companies with a nationwide network of operations are the exception rather than the rule. Two notable examples are Daiei, which has picked Marubeni trading group and others as its partners, and Misawa Home Holdings, which is set to receive help from Toyota Motor Corp.

    By contrast, there is little likelihood that big companies with national reach or foreign investment funds will come to the aid of local businesses. Not only is their relatively small size a disadvantage, but the business climate is generally more harsh in the countryside. So those businesses have no choice other than to find partners in the communities or regions where they operate.

    One encouraging development in this regard is the creation of revival funds by regional banks — proof that they are taking a more active role in local-level corporate rehabilitation. The "revival business" is attracting not only foreign funds but major brokerages and leasing firms. Institutional investors are interested in turnaround funds.

    The fact remains, though, that the number of "turnaround experts" — those who have experience and expertise essential to corporate rehabilitation — is extremely limited in local areas.

    As an alternative, some of the specialists dispatched by the IRCJ to aid businesses in receivership are reportedly serving as their de facto chief executive officers or management advisers.

    These specialists, however, normally return to the IRCJ head office in about a year. After their departure, the businesses involved will need to figure out ways to rebuild themselves largely on their own. With the IRCJ ending its mission in 2008, how to train such specialists is a vital question.

The Japan Times Weekly
April 23, 2005
(C) All rights reserved

      問題は、解散時の機構の損失が国民負担となる可能性があることだ。政府保証枠10兆円で発足した機構は、そのうち1兆円を債権買取、資本増強に使った。

      機構は銀行から買い取った債権をできるだけ高値で売却し、国民負担を最小にするよう努めねばならない。

      最初の2年間で、機構はダイエー、カネボウ、マンション大手の大京などの大企業から中小企業にいたる41社を支援先に選定した。対象企業のうち、8社はすでに黒字転換した。その他の企業に損失を出さぬように再建させるのが機構の使命である。

      支援先企業の多くは多額の不良債権を抱えていた。多くは破産手続きにより、迅速に不良債権を処理できたはずだが、地域経済に対する影響を恐れ、公的資金による「軟着陸」の道を選んだ。

      関係銀行は、産業再生へ向けて企業の債権放棄を受け入れる方向へ傾いている。

      支援先企業にスポンサー企業を見つけるのは容易ではない。丸紅グループなどの支援を受けるダイエー、トヨタ自動車の支援を受けるミサワホームホールディングスなどの大企業は例外である。地方の中小企業に支援の手を伸ばす大企業は少ない。

      地方銀行が地域の企業再建に関与し始めたことは歓迎すべきである。

      経営再建専門家は地方では非常に少ない。産業再生機構が派遣する専門家が支援先企業の最高経営責任者になっている例もあるが、1年後には本社に戻ってしまう。その後、関係企業は独自に再建の道を探らねばならない。機構は08年の解散までに再建専門家を育成することが重要だ。