Mr. Koizumi wins his mandate
(From The Japan Times Sept. 13 issue)

小泉政権の圧勝

    The clear-cut, simple rhetoric employed by Mr. Koizumi, who focused on postal-service privatization and called it the cornerstone of reform during campaigning, won the hearts of voters.

    In contrast, Mr. Katsuya Okada, the leader of the Democratic Party of Japan, failed to put together a persuasive message to sell his policy measures.

    The election results also point to strong voter support for Mr. Koizumi's maverick political style, which goes against the grain of Japan's postwar politics. Mr. Koizumi went to the extreme of purging opponents of the postal-service privatization bills from his Liberal-Democratic Party, drawing a clear line between his political friends and foes.

    Certainly, the election results should be viewed as an approval of the postal bills. But they should not be taken as a wholesale mandate for Mr. Koizumi's policy measures as he failed to elaborate on his future reform plans during the campaign.

    In addition to his campaign rhetoric, Mr. Koizumi's tactic in selecting candidates greatly helped the LDP. He ran his handpicked candidates, or "assassins" — many of them high-profile women — against the opponents of the postal bills in their constituencies. This tactic created a theater effect, which increased turnout and appeared to have attracted voters to the LDP's side.

    Now that Mr. Koizumi has purged the opponents of postal reforms from the LDP, the governing party will be considerably different from what it was in the past.

    Mr. Koizumi has succeeded in "purifying" the party along his policy lines and he will use the election victory as leverage to impose his will on party factions and members.

    Though constitutionally questionable, Mr. Koizumi's decision to dissolve the Lower House after the defeat of the postal bills in the Upper House more than paid off. The LDP and its coalition partner New Komeito, which garnered more than two-thirds of the Lower House seats, will be legally able to overturn a vote by the Upper House even if the latter rejects the postal-reform bills.

    During the campaign, Mr. Koizumi told the voters that freeing up ¥340 trillion in postal savings would not only revitalize the economy but also advance administrative and financial reforms. But it would be simplistic to think that postal-service privatization can solve all the structural problems the nation faces.

    Even if the postal bills pass the Diet, the nation will have to struggle with other immensely difficult issues, such as its enormous ¥700 trillion debt and reform of social security, including pension and medical services, which is becoming urgent as the population grays and shrinks due to the declining birth rate.

    Had it employed more skill, the DPJ could have exploited these serious problems to effectively attack the LDP during the campaign. The defeat of the No. 1 opposition party can be attributed to Mr. Okada's failure to present a clear antithesis in the debate over postal services, the central theme of Mr. Koizumi's campaign. While opposing Mr. Koizumi's postal bills, Mr. Okada did not rule out privatization of postal services in the future and even mentioned the possibility of simply abolishing the postal savings and insurance services.

    Mr. Koizumi's steadfast insistence on the importance of his postal reforms gave the voters the impression that he is a reliable and strong leader with firm beliefs, while Mr. Okada's stance made him appear to be fuzzy and unclear on this central issue. The lesson is that if an opposition party wants to grab power, it must first pinpoint the real issues, show a strong will to resolve them, work out realistic proposals and present them in an easy-to-understand and appealing way to the voters.

    In the postelection politics, the parties need to work out a detailed strategy to end the nation's reliance on the issuance of bonds to raise revenue and to reduce the central government's expenditures. Tax increases and the imposition of other financial burdens might become necessary to achieve financial reconstruction and prevent the collapse of social security.

    The parties must first present convincing plans to reduce government expenditures, such as streamlining the bureaucracy and eliminating wasteful spending, and then present their future tax proposals.

    Now that the governing coalition has been given an overwhelming majority in the Lower House, it must meet voters' expectations by presenting policy measures that give the public a greater sense of security.

The Japan Times Weekly
Sept. 17, 2005
(C) All rights reserved

      選挙結果は、有権者が首相独特の政治スタイルと郵政民営化を支持したことを示しているが、彼の政策全般に対する無条件支持を意味するものではない。首相は、さまざまな課題についての改革計画を選挙運動中に明示しなかった。

      首相はその巧みな話術に加え、郵政法案に反対した前自民党議員の選挙区に「刺客」（多くは著名女性）を送り、「劇場効果」を演出して有権者の関心を引いた。造反分子を追放し、自民党を「浄化」した彼は、選挙での圧勝をてこに党全体に対し自身の考えを強く主張するようになるだろう。

      衆院の3分の2以上の議席を獲得した自公連立政権は、参院が郵政民営化法案を否決しても、衆院へ再提出して成立させることが可能だ。しかし同法案が国会成立しても、700兆円に上る政府債務問題、年金、医療などの社会保障改革を含む重要懸案が目白押しだ。

      郵政民営化について強硬な主張を繰り返して、信念を持つ強力な指導者のイメージを植えつけた首相に対し、岡田代表は同問題について明確な意見を持っていない印象を与えた。野党が政権交代を狙うなら、最重要問題に焦点を当て、現実的な解決法を分かりやすく有権者に提示すべきだ。

      総選挙後、各党は国債依存の財務体質を改善する政策を策定する必要がある。財政再建、社会保障改革のため、増税などの国民負担増が必要になる可能性もある。しかし税制改革よりも、まず公務員、歳出の削減計画が必要だ。

      連立与党が衆院で圧倒的多数を獲得した今、国民を安心させる政策を発表して、有権者の期待に応えねばならない。