LDP factions' diminishing role
(From The Japan Times Oct. 12 issue)

自民党派閥政治の転換

    Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, who assumed the LDP presidency in 2001, has since vowed to "smash the party" — implying, among other things, that he is determined to destroy the factionalism that stands in the way of his structural reform initiatives. He has urged all 83 newly elected LDP legislators not to join any faction.

    The LDP has developed largely as a conglomerate of factions since the merger of the Liberal Party and the Democratic Party in 1955. In fact, the new party at its inception was dubbed an "army of eight divisions." The ultimate aim of a faction has been, and still is, to have its leader elected party president and prime minister.

    Therefore, faction leaders have done everything in their power to maintain and expand their groups. For example, they have financed the election campaigns of followers and arranged for key members of their factions to get Cabinet and party posts. Thus factions have operated as "parties within a party" — an operation that has required a huge war chest.

    That is part of the reason why money-driven political scandals have proliferated among LDP politicians. More often than not, rival factions locked in power struggles have tried to serve their interests first — not the party's, still less the nation's — creating a deep mistrust of LDP politics among the people.

    It is also true, though, that factional politics has done the LDP — and the nation — considerable good. During its long one-party rule, which continued until 1993 when a non-LDP coalition administration came into office, power effectively transferred from one faction to another. These swings of the intraparty political pendulum have allowed the party to make major policy changes without seriously jeopardizing its unity.

    For example, Japan-China relations were normalized under Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka following a stalemate in the administration of Prime Minister Eisaku Sato. A valued-added consumption tax was introduced in 1989 by Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita in the wake of Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone's failed plan for a "sales tax."

    It is not just policy issues that factional power change has resolved. The Tanaka administration, for instance, was beset by money scandals, including those involving himself. He was replaced by Prime Minister Takeo Miki, who was widely regarded as a "clean" politician. The LDP's image as a scandal-tainted party improved, if temporarily, during the Miki administration.

    One thing that has contributed in a large way to these "quasi-power shifts" among LDP factions is the consistent efforts of faction leaders, underscored by the will to steer the nation, to articulate domestic and foreign policy goals and challenges. In the case of Mr. Koizumi, himself a former faction chief, his central policy is to privatize the postal services — a policy goal he began to advocate long before taking office.

    Now the LDP faces a dilemma of sorts. The decline of factional influence has sapped the influence of faction leaders, thus reducing their chances of becoming the party president and the prime minister. In fact, not a single faction head is included in the purported list of likely successors to Mr. Koizumi. An LDP presidential election is a year away, yet no Liberal Democrats are coming up with policy plans of their own. This could mean that only those loyal to Mr. Koizumi may have the best chance of succeeding him.

    The diminishing weight of factions raises questions about the prospects for "training politicians." Factions once played a vital role in tapping promising candidates and educating elected ones. The party has held orientation seminars for the 83 newcomers, but much more needs to be done to help develop their political abilities.

    The latest election, which Mr. Koizumi defined as a referendum on his postal reform agenda, has shown that the LDP leadership has a powerful right to select official candidates according to its criteria. Some anti-reform candidates, including veteran legislators, were rejected as "outsiders."

    LDP executives, from Mr. Koizumi on down, would do well to establish clear-cut standards for candidate selection as well as guideposts for intraparty training. Also in order is an objective re-examination of the merits and demerits of factionalism.

The Japan Times Weekly
Oct. 15, 2005
(C) All rights reserved

    01年に総裁に就任した小泉首相は「自民党をぶっ壊す」と宣言、構造改革を妨げる派閥政治を打破する決意を表明した。今回の総選挙で当選した83人の自民党新人議員全員にも派閥に参加しないよう求めた。

    1955年の保守合同以来、自民党は派閥の集合体として機能してきた。派閥の目的は、その領袖を党総裁、首相の地位につけることだった。

    領袖は、派閥の勢力を拡大し、選挙資金を関係議員に分配、主要メンバーを閣僚、党役員ポストにつけるべく運動してきた。派閥は巨額の資金が必要になり、不祥事が絶えなかった。

    一方、派閥政治の長所として、政権が各派閥間で円滑に交代し、政策の継続性が維持されたことが挙げられる。例えば日中国交正常化は、佐藤政権のもとで交渉が行き詰まっていたが、田中政権のもとで達成された。中曽根政権が導入に失敗した売上税は、竹下政権により一般消費税として復活した。金銭スキャンダルに見舞われた田中政権の後は「クリーン」とされた三木政権が誕生、党のイメージも一時的にせよ改善された。

    派閥政治の衰退で、派閥の領袖の党総裁・首相就任の可能性は低くなり、1年後の総裁選で小泉首相の側近が後継候補となる可能性は高い。

    議員育成にも派閥の出番が少なくなった。今回の当選議員には党が研修を行っているが、新人議員の能力開発にはさらなる努力が必要だ。

    小泉首相は今回の総選挙を郵政民営化に対する国民投票と位置づけ、党執行部が独自の基準で候補者を選んだ。改革に反対する候補者は、古参議員も含め、公認されなかった。

    首相はじめ自民党指導部は、候補者選び、議員育成について明確な基準を作成し、派閥政治の功罪を客観的に評価すべきだ。