Mr. Kim walks a very fine line
(From The Japan Times Jan. 24 issue)

金総書記の中国訪問

    He knows how to get attention: His "secret" trip to China dominated international media even though there was no official confirmation made that he was visiting the country. The reclusive leader will need all his skills as he tries to maximize North Korean leverage as pressure mounts to resume the multilateral negotiations over his country's nuclear weapons program.

    Apparently, there is an agreement between Beijing and Pyongyang not to announce visits by Mr. Kim until he has returned home. While that delayed the Chinese Foreign Ministry's comments on his trip, it did not silence the speculation over the purpose of his nine-day visit. Stops in Guangzhou, Shenzhen and Zhuhai in southern Guangdong province, the heart of China's export machine, and Mr. Kim's praise of their economic progress, suggest that economic reform topped Mr. Kim's concerns.

    Emulating the Chinese example is another matter, however.

    While North Korea is desperately poor and it has experimented with limited economic reform, the process has been fitful at best. Market reforms implemented a few years ago — after another of Mr. Kim's trips to China — have been rolled back in recent months. It appears as though the country's political system — and its domination by Mr. Kim and his allies in the military — cannot absorb the inevitable side effects of even limited reforms.

    North Korea's nuclear weapons programs were the second item on Mr. Kim's agenda.

    The North Korean government agreed in the Sept. 19 Joint Declaration issued by the parties to the six-nation talks that those negotiations aim to achieve the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. North Korea, however, turned its back on those discussions after the United States imposed sanctions in September on a Macau bank, Banco Delta Asia, accused of laundering illicit funds for North Korea and in October on eight companies charged with proliferating weapons of mass destruction components.

    Even though North Korea has insisted that it will not return to the negotiating table until the United States lifts those sanctions, the Chinese and North Korean governments announced that Mr. Kim reaffirmed his country's commitment to a peaceful settlement and a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.

    Meeting Chinese President Hu Jintao in Beijing, the two leaders promised to work together to "overcome present difficulties" in the negotiations.

    That pledge was soon tested: Mr. Christopher Hill, U.S. assistant secretary of state and the chief negotiator at the six-nation talks, turned up in Beijing on Jan. 18 — at the same time as Mr. Kim — and reportedly met with his North Korean counterpart, Kim Kye Gwan, vice minister of Foreign Affairs. The two men, however, did not reach agreement to resume the six-nation talks.

    Economic reform and the nuclear negotiations are part of a bigger mission: shoring up Chinese support for North Korea. Beijing provides the food and energy that keeps the North Korean government in power, but that support is not unconditional.

    On several occasions, Beijing has made it clear that it too has "red lines" that North Korea must not cross. When Pyongyang declared Sept. 20 that it would not dismantle its nuclear weapons programs until after it received a light-water reactor, China immediately rejected the idea, saying that was not what the six nations had agreed the day before.

    Despite its dependence on foreign support — besides Chinese assistance, South Korean aid and the international community, more generally, have helped the North weather its economic difficulties — North Korea remains a fiercely proud country. Pyongyang will go to considerable lengths to demonstrate its independence. From one perspective, North Korea is ready to bite the hand that feeds it. A Korean nationalist would say Mr. Kim is doing his very best to play a weak hand.

    First, there is the struggle between reform and regime survival. China believes economics and politics can be divided; its history is proof of that. But North Koreans are reluctant to believe the Chinese experience is applicable to them. As a result, Pyongyang tacks between liberalization and tighter economic control.

    Second, Mr. Kim wants to send the message that Pyongyang looks to Beijing for support — economic and moral — without appearing to be a supplicant. This means lining up behind Chinese positions on key issues — or appearing to — while asserting its independence as often as possible.

    Most significantly, it means that North Korea will scrutinize every position of its diplomatic partners, looking for room to exploit differences. Therefore, Pyongyang's key negotiating partners — China, South Korea, the United States and Japan — must identify areas of agreement on key concerns, such as the six-nation talks, and ensure that they speak with one voice. It is one thing to indulge Pyongyang's penchant for secrecy and quite another to encourage it to flout international norms.

The Japan Times Weekly
Jan. 28, 2006
(C) All rights reserved

    訪問は正式発表されなかったため憶測を呼んだ。訪中の目的は不明だが、同国貿易の中心地、広東省南部などを歴訪したことで、北朝鮮が経済改革を志向しているとの報道もあった。しかし中国の経済改革に倣うのは容易ではない。

    貧困国北朝鮮は、限定的経済改革を実施してきたが成果をあげたとはいえず、数年前実施の市場改革も大きく後退している。

    訪中の目的はまた、北朝鮮の核開発にもある。昨年9月19日、この問題に関する6ヵ国協議で、北朝鮮を含む参加各国は朝鮮半島の非核化を目指すことで合意した。

    しかしその後、北朝鮮は6ヵ国協議への参加を拒否している。米国が北朝鮮の資金洗浄に関与したとされるマカオの銀行と、大量破壊兵器拡散に関与したとされる北朝鮮企業8社に制裁を課したためである。

    金総書記は訪中時に胡錦涛中国国家主席と会談、停滞している6ヵ国協議を再開するため協力することで合意したという。

    経済改革と核開発をめぐる交渉は、中国の対北朝鮮援助に関連がある。中国は北朝鮮に対し、食料、エネルギー援助を行っているが、それは条件つきである。北朝鮮が9月20日、軽水炉の提供を受けるまで核開発計画放棄を拒否する姿勢を見せると、中国は北朝鮮の立場は6ヵ国協議の合意に反すると非難した。

    各国から援助を受けながらも独自の路線を貫き通している北朝鮮は、政権存続と改革の問題を抱えている。

    中国は、自国の歴史が証明するように、政治と経済は分離できると主張するが、北朝鮮は、中国的手法が自国に適用できるか疑問を持っており、自由化と経済統制強化の間で揺れ動いている。

    北朝鮮は中国の支援を必要としながら、それを懇願することを避けている。重要問題について中国に同調しながら、できるだけ独自の路線を維持したいのだ。

    そこで北朝鮮は、参加各国の立場の相違を利用して有利な立場に立とうとしている。中国、韓国、米国、日本は6ヵ国協議などで意見を統一して北朝鮮と交渉せねばならない。北朝鮮の秘密主義を許容しても、国際的規範を無視させるようなことがあってはならない。