Same old 'new' Iraq strategy
(From The Japan Times January 13 issue)

ブッシュ大統領のイラク新戦略

    Most significantly, the fundamental dilemma for the United States remains: It (and the world) cannot afford to see Iraq collapse into chaos and success depends on a government emerging from the rubble of Baghdad to take control of the country, but there is no sign that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is prepared to do that, or that the United States. can force him to do so.

    Mr. Bush's new approach consists of three pillars. The first is the introduction of over 20,000 more U.S. troops to help stabilize Baghdad and "help the Iraqis break the current cycle of violence." Baghdad is key because 80 percent of the sectarian violence occurs within 45 km of the capital. According to Mr. Bush, "This violence is splitting Baghdad into sectarian enclaves and shaking the confidence of all Iraqis."

    Mr. Bush conceded that previous efforts to end the violence had failed because "there were not enough troops to secure neighborhoods that had been cleared of terrorists and insurgents," and "there were too many restrictions on the troops we did have." Now, the restraints on numbers and tactics will be lifted.

    While the United States. is increasing its presence, the real weight is to be born by the Iraqis, and this is the second pillar of his new approach: the establishment of "benchmarks" to ensure that Iraq takes responsibility for its future. As Mr. Bush explained, "America's commitment is not open-ended. If the Iraqi government does not follow through on its promises, it will lose the support of the American people."

    The third pillar is Mr. Bush's pledge to "disrupt the attacks on our forces. We will interrupt the flow of support from Iran and Syria. And we will seek out and destroy the networks providing advanced weaponry and training to our enemies in Iraq." This is a potentially ominous promise as it threatens to widen the conflict in the region. In recent raids, coalition forces have detained a number of Iranians, claiming that they were tied to terrorist attacks and the insurgency. This could provide the pretext for military action against Tehran.

    The president is right to argue that a retreat now would risk the collapse of Iraq and constitute a blow to U.S. credibility in the region and around the world. But the policy faces a number of serious — if not crippling — obstacles.

    The first is the lack of support within the United States. The new Democratic leadership in Congress has made its opposition plain. More worrisome for Mr. Bush is increasing resistance from his Republican party; potential presidential candidates and senators concerned about their own 2008 electoral prospects are distancing themselves from him. Sen. Chuck Hagel, a Republican and likely presidential candidate, said the speech "represents the most dangerous foreign-policy blunder in this country since Vietnam, if it's carried out."

    Most troubling of all, many Americans agree. One poll shows 70 percent of Americans oppose sending more troops, and they don't think an increase will help stabilize the situation in Iraq. Resistance will increase: Mr. Bush conceded that more troops embracing a more aggressive strategy will result in more violence and yet more casualties on top of the 3,000 lives of U.S. soldiers already lost.

    The second fundamental problem is the ability of the Iraqis to "step up." As Mr. Bush admitted, any U.S. support for the war effort depends on Iraqis taking responsibility for their country. While his speech outlined a series of steps Iraq would take to shoulder that burden, there was no indication of the timeline nor of what the United States would do if Baghdad failed. Iraq has been trying to build up the forces it needs to stabilize the country; those efforts have not succeeded in four years.

    Prime Minister Maliki has shown no inclination to confront and disarm the Shiite militias that perpetuate the violence (and he may not want to since his support comes from the Shiites). Yet that is the "restriction" on troop operations that Mr. Bush has said has been lifted.

    The biggest problem for Mr. Bush is a contradiction: The Iraqi government knows that the U.S. president will not accept defeat; indeed, if the stakes are as high as Mr. Bush explained, then he cannot afford to leave. That knowledge provides Mr. Maliki with the means to resist or ignore benchmarks.

The Japan Times Weekly: Jan. 20, 2007
(C) All rights reserved

    第2の柱は、イラクの治安回復状況に関する「判断基準」の設定だ。大統領は、「米国の支援は無限ではない」と述べた。

    第3の柱は、米軍に対する攻撃を阻止し、イラン・シリアからの支援を断ち切り、イラクの武装勢力に兵器を供給し、訓練を行っているテロリストのネットワークを破壊することだという。

    大統領の「今撤退すれば、イラク政権の崩壊につながり、米国の信頼を傷つける」という主張は正しいが、新戦略には多くの問題がある。

    第1に、米国内で大統領の戦略に対する支持が低下している。議会の民主党指導部は反対を鮮明にし、共和党内でも反対が強まっている。08年の大統領選に野心を持つ政治家は、ブッシュ大統領と距離を置きつつある。

    米市民にも、大統領の政策に対する反対が強くなっている。ある世論調査によれば、回答者の70%がイラクへの米軍増派に反対している。イラクでは、すでに3,000人の米軍兵士が死亡しており、増派でさらに死者が増える恐れがある。

    第2に、国家安定のためのイラク軍強化計画が失敗した場合の米国の具体的対応策がない。

    イラクのマリキ首相は、シーア派の支持に依存しており、暴力連鎖の原因になっている同派の民兵組織の武装解除に積極的でない。

    イラク政府は、ブッシュ大統領は敗北を受け入れられないから撤退できないことを承知しており、マリキ首相は「判断基準」を無視するだろう。