China's courtship of Africa
(From The Japan Times Feb. 9 issue)

世界的勢力拡大を続ける中国

    The attention China pays to Africa reflects several core national interests. The first is economic: China is increasingly reliant on the continent for raw materials. Africa supplies one-third of China's oil: Angola is China's No. 1 source, and China imports substantial supplies from Sudan and Nigeria too. Beijing gets bauxite from Guinea, copper from Zambia, uranium from Namibia and rare metals from Congo.

    The economic relationship goes both ways: China is investing heavily in Africa and sending products to Africa.

    The result has been a quadrupling of trade since 2002; last year, China-Africa trade hit $55.6 billion and is expected to reach $110 billion by 2010.

    Economic ties grease diplomatic relations. Last year, Mr. Hu hosted a summit for nearly 50 African leaders, the largest diplomatic event of its kind in postwar Chinese history.

    During the meetings, Chinese companies signed deals worth nearly $2 billion and Mr. Hu pledged $5 billion in loans and credit to Africa and a doubling of aid by 2009.

    The first tranche of that aid — $3 billion — was announced prior to Mr. Hu's recent departure.

    Diplomatic support pays other dividends. Beijing has been relentless in its efforts to woo the remaining countries that recognize Taiwan, several of which are in Africa.

    Africa is also an arena of diplomatic competition with Japan, as Tokyo and Beijing seek to expand their influence and find supporters for their various international initiatives.

    China engages these countries in markedly different ways than does the West. It is less likely to scrutinize its partner governments' behavior. For example, Beijing has been unwilling to criticize the Sudan government's appalling actions in Darfur where hundreds of thousands are estimated to have been killed and millions displaced; the United Nations calls it genocide.

    China's blindness is partly a result of the oil rights it has acquired from the government in Khartoum, but it also reflects different thinking about sovereignty and the appropriate development model for a nation.

    China maintains that economic development should precede political development and, more importantly, that those priorities should not be challenged by outsiders. That approach — which has been called "the Beijing consensus" in contrast to the "Washington consensus" that has been embraced by most international lending institutions — has many supporters in Africa. Some argue it is a source of "soft power" and an increasingly valuable asset for China.

    China's growing presence has disadvantages as well. There is a growing view in Africa that China is the latest in a long line of colonialists. South African officials charge that local high unemployment rates are the result of cheap Chinese imports.

    There are increasingly widespread reports of shoddy — and sometimes dangerous — Chinese goods throughout the region. Chinese oil workers in Nigeria have been kidnapped, and more such incidents are likely as the Chinese presence expands throughout the continent.

    In Zambia, a Chinese mining company was accused of banning unions and cutting corners on safety. An explosion at the explosives company affiliated with the mine killed dozens of people; protesters were shot by a manager a year later.

    In last year's election, one Zambian presidential candidate charged his country was becoming "a province of China" and pledged to throw out Chinese companies if he won.

    While he did not, the fact that he could make China an issue in the election shows the depth of the ill feeling toward Beijing — and unleashed similar complaints in other countries.

    China's growing presence also focuses attention on how Beijing uses its influence. Beijing is coming under pressure for shielding Khartoum and Mr. Hu urged that the government be flexible toward the U.N. and the African Union's initiative aimed at realizing peace in Darfur.

    Mr. Hu's failure to urge Khartoum would have lent credence to the charge that Beijing is not the responsible nation that it claims to be. China's behavior will be increasingly scrutinized by Africans and outsiders. Therein lies the best hope for ensuring that "China's rise" is truly in the interests of all countries, not just the Chinese.

The Japan Times Weekly: Feb. 17, 2007
(C) All rights reserved

    中国は、重要資源の供給について大きくアフリカに依存し、原油の3分の1をアフリカから輸入する。大部分はアンゴラが供給源で、スーダン、ナイジェリアも大量に供給している。また、ボーキサイトはギニア、銅はザンビア、ウラニウムはナミビア、希少金属はコンゴから輸入している。

    胡主席は昨年、約50ヵ国のアフリカ諸国との北京サミットを主催した。中国企業は20億ドルの貿易信用供与に合意、胡主席は50億ドルの借款などの供与と、09年までに援助の倍増を約した。中国は日本と共に、アフリカ各国に対し、それぞれの外交活動の支持を求めて競っている。

    しかし中国は、スーダンのダルフール地方の殺戮など、欧米が糾弾する問題を黙視してきた。

    アフリカには中国製の安物商品が溢れており、ナイジェリアでは中国人の石油産業労働者が誘拐されるなどの事件も起きた。

    ザンビアの中国系鉱山では労働組合を禁止し、安全対策を怠っているといわれ、系列の爆発物製造会社では、爆発で数十人が死亡している。

    ザンビアの昨年の選挙で、ある候補者は国が事実上「中国の1地域」になっていると主張し、勝利すれば、中国系企業を追放すると公約した。候補者は敗れたが、中国問題が選挙の争点になることが、反中感情の強さを示している。

    胡主席は、スーダン政府に対し、国連とアフリカ連合のダルフール紛争に対する和平工作に柔軟に対応するよう求めた。

    中国の動きは、アフリカ国家、国際社会に厳しい目で見られるだろう。中国の高まる存在感が、自国ばかりでなく、国際社会の利益になることが望まれる。