Mr. Abe's summit success
(From The Japan Times April 30 issue)

「かけがえのない日米同盟」

    Mr. Abe's U.S. visit took place at a time when there were seeds of schism between the two nations. The biggest one stemmed from differences over the two nations' approaches to North Korea's nuclear-weapons program. In a policy turnaround, the U.S. adopted a more flexible stance toward the North and made a concession by announcing the release of $25 million in North Korean funds that had been frozen in a Macau bank. Japan, meanwhile, insisted that it would not join a program to ship oil to North Korea — part of the "initial action phase" included in the Feb. 13 six-party agreement — unless the issue of abduction of Japanese nationals by North Korea was first solved. These differences raised the possibility that Japan would be isolated in the six-party talks.

    At the summit, however, Mr. Abe gained what he wanted on the North Korea issue — unity between Japan and the U.S. He and Mr. Bush agreed on the possibility of new sanctions against North Korea unless it abides by the Feb. 13 promise to soon take initial denuclearization steps. Mr. Bush said, "Our partners in the six-party talks are patient, but our patience is not unlimited." His statement, apparently aimed at countering the argument that the U.S. has suddenly become soft toward North Korea, may be a hint that the U.S. would be willing to once again adopt a tough stance toward Pyongyang. As for the abduction issue, Mr. Bush told Mr. Abe that his strong feelings on the issue would not diminish and that he would like to cooperate with the Japanese government.

    Another problem that was feared to be a source of possible division between Japan and the U.S. was Mr. Abe's revisionist view of history as revealed by his remarks on Japan's wartime use of sex slaves. In early March, Mr. Abe said that there was no evidence to show that the Japanese military used coercion "in a narrow sense of the word" in recruiting Asian women for sexual servitude. This raised suspicions and apprehension in the U.S. to the point of U.S. Ambassador to Japan Thomas Schieffer warning that Mr. Abe's remarks would create a disastrous effect if they were taken in the U.S. as "backing away" from the 1993 Kono apology on the matter.

    Mr. Abe managed to tide over the problem by saying at the Camp David news conference, "I as an individual and as prime minister sympathize from the bottom of my heart with former 'comfort women' who went through extreme hardships." Mr. Bush helped him, responding, "The comfort women issue was a regrettable chapter in the history of the world and I accept the prime minister's apology."

    In the security field, Mr. Abe told Mr. Bush that Japan will initiate a study aimed at changing the government's traditional stance that the war-renouncing Article 9 of the Constitution prohibits Japan from exercising the right to collective defense. The study will cover only a limited number of cases, including the use of interceptor missiles to destroy ballistic missiles aimed at an ally, and the mounting of defenses when an ally's warship sailing with Maritime Self-Defense Force vessels is attacked on the high seas. It could, however, lead to an abandonment of Japan's long-standing Constitution-derived defense policy. Moreover, this study would be conducted solely by a private advisory body for the prime minister and would make no provision for broad-based public discussions on the matter.

    Such a move would not only jeopardize the nation's constitutional integrity, but also rouse suspicions among Japan's neighbors over its military intentions. This, in turn, could destabilize East Asia's security situation, or at the very least be counterproductive to the cause of creating a desirable security environment.

    In other fields, Mr. Abe and Mr. Bush also agreed on the need for continuous global action to cope with climate change, and stressed the importance of developing technology for clean energy. Apparently taking into consideration the fact that the Kyoto Protocol expires in 2012, the two leaders agreed on the need for cooperation to work out measures to cover the post-Kyoto period. This is an encouraging sign in view of the fact that the U.S. has chosen not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol.

The Japan Times Weekly: May 5, 2007
(C) All rights reserved

    両首脳は、北朝鮮が非核化へむけて第1歩を踏み出さねば、新たな制裁を科する可能性について合意した。大統領は、日本人拉致問題の解決のため、日本政府と協力する意向を表明した。

    また、「従軍慰安婦」の強制連行を裏付ける直接証拠はなかったという安倍首相の発言が米国で問題になっていたが、安倍氏は「人間として、首相として心から申し訳ない」と述べ、大統領は謝罪を受け入れた。

    安全保障問題では、首相は「日本憲法9条は集団的自衛権の行使を禁止している」とのこれまでの政府解釈の見直しに向けて研究を進めると述べた。研究は、同盟国に向けて発射されたミサイルの迎撃、公海で自衛艦と並走する同盟国軍の艦船が攻撃された場合の反撃などの限定された状況での対処法などを扱う。

    集団的自衛権の行使は、憲法に基づく専守防衛政策を放棄することになるのに、研究は首相直属の有識者会議で行われ、幅広い国民的議論は予定されていない。このような動きは、立憲国の理念と相いれず、近隣諸国を反発させ、望ましい安全保障環境に逆効果となりえる。

    また両首脳は、気候変動に対処するための世界的協力の必要などについて合意した。さらに、京都議定書の期限切れ（2012年）後の地球温暖化対策について協力することに同意した。米国が京都議定書の枠組みに参加を拒否していることを考えれば、これは歓迎すべき動きだ。