Kyoto, by way of Marrakech

マラケシュ合意

The 1997 Kyoto Protocol calls on about 40 industrial countries to cut the greenhouse gas emissions that have been blamed for raising the Earth's temperature. The accord assigns each country a target and sets an average 5.2 percent emission reduction from 1990 levels that must be achieved by 2012. Countries can use "carbon sinks" — forests and farmlands that absorb carbon dioxide — to offset some of their emissions. Yet more credits can be earned by helping developing countries cut their carbon dioxide emissions. And countries can trade emissions — they can buy and sell the right to pollute.

Figuring out how that scheme would work has been difficult. Previous meetings have broken up in rancor. Undaunted, representatives from 165 countries met in Marrakech, Morocco, over the last two weeks to hammer out the legal rules that will govern implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. Although there were concerns that agreement would once again prove elusive, they managed to reach a deal at the last hour.

The final text is a lengthy and complicated document. Of particular importance is the agreement that signatories will face mandatory punishment if they fail to meet their emission targets. This provision gives the Kyoto Protocol its teeth. While some environmentalists argue that various components of the treaty — the use of carbon sinks, the emissions trading — are mere loopholes, the negotiations have yielded a document with legally enforceable standards. The final agreement may not cause a large reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, but it will lead to a reduction. In other words, it is an important first step.

There is one more step in the process, however. The document does not go into force until it has been ratified by 55 countries, among them the polluters responsible for 55 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions in 1990. That is expected to occur next year. In fact, almost every industrial country will have to ratify the accord because the United States, the biggest single source of greenhouse gases — about a quarter of the total — has opted out of the protocol. Although the U.S. helped negotiate the agreement, President George W. Bush has withdrawn his country from the agreement and has said his administration will set up its own plan of action.

Mr. Bush has three objections to the treaty. First, he believes that it will put too great a burden on the U.S. economy. As the U.S. enters into a recession, that argument is sounding more persuasive. U.S. greenhouse gas emissions increased 3.1 percent last year, and have grown by 14 percent since 1990. Cutting U.S. emissions to levels that would comply with the protocol would extract a huge cost. Second, Mr. Bush objects to the exemption of developing countries, such as India and China, from the treaty provisions. While those countries do not emit as much greenhouse gas per capita as developed economies, the size of their populations means that their gross emissions will soon be as large as those of developed nations. Finally, he does not like the mandatory nature of the treaty. He wants compliance to be voluntary and he wants national schemes to reflect particular national conditions, rather than any single global plan.

Mr. Bush's concerns are understandable, but U.S. actions to date make it difficult to sympathize with his position. Washington has said that it will not return to the Kyoto Protocol; instead it will take independent action to fight global warning. The Bush administration has promised to reveal the specifics of that plan, but it has not done so, nor has it said when that would occur. Moreover, every country will be pressed to comply with the agreement. Japan has agreed to cut its greenhouse gas emissions by 6 percent from the 1990 level, but they have grown by 17 percent since 1990. The government plans to submit several bills to next year's ordinary session of the Diet to lay the groundwork for Japan's ratification of the Kyoto Protocol by the end of 2002. Like the U.S. government, many Japanese businesses and business groups object to the Kyoto burdens. Others see them as an opportunity to create new competitive advantages. In an increasingly environmentally conscious market, companies that provide those products will have a leg up on the competition. That is the way to look at the Kyoto "burdens" — if the prospect of global warming, changing weather patterns and resulting large shifts in global economic behavior is not incentive enough.

The Japan Times: Nov. 13, 2001
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     交渉の道のりは困難をきわめ、これまでの会議は何 度も物別れに終わったが、165ヶ国の代表はモロッコの マラケシュで議論を重ね、ついに京都議定書の運用ル ールを定めた。このマラケシュ合意も拘束力に関する 懸念は残るものの、とにかく参加国は土壇場で合意に 達した。最終文書で特に重要なのは署名国が削減目標 を守れなかった場合の罰則制度だ。この条項は京都議 定書に威力を与える。森林吸収や排出権取引は抜け穴 だと主張する環境保護論者もいるが、交渉の結果、法 的拘束力のある基準を盛り込んだ文書が作成された。 多少なりとも温室効果ガス削減に結びつくであろう今 回の合意は、最初の一歩としては意義がある。

     しかしこの合意文書は、90年の時点で地球全体の温 室効果ガスの55%を排出する55ヶ国が批准しなければ 発効しない。発効は来年の予定だが、最大の排出国で ある米国が議定書不支持を表明しているため、ほとん ど全ての工業国の批准が必要だ。ブッシュ米大統領は 京都議定書に反対する理由を三つあげている。第一に、 米国経済に負担がかかりすぎること。第二に、インド や中国など途上国を排出削減義務の対象外としている こと。第三に、議定書の命令的な性質を問題視してお り、各国は自由意志で参加し、国ごとに計画を策定す べきだと主張する。米政府は京都議定書には参加せず、 独自の地球温暖化対策を実施すると言い、具体案を発 表すると約束したが、それはまだ実行されていない。

     日本は90年の排出量比で6%の削減に同意したが、 実際の排出量は17%も増加している。政府は来年の通 常国会に法案を提出し、年末までの批准の下地作りを する意向だ。環境意識が高まるなか、環境に配慮した 製品を提供する企業は競争優位を確保するだろう。京 都議定書の｢負担｣はそのように見るべきではないか。

The Japan Times Weekly
Nov. 24, 2001
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