Guess Hu is in charge of China
(From The Japan Times October 13 issue)

権力強化を図る胡錦涛中国主席

    About 350 officials lead the 70 million member CCP. They gather annually to discuss policy and chart the overall direction of the country. The theme of this year's Plenum was "Building a harmonious society." It is the rhetorical formula that Hu has developed during his tenure to guide policy. In simple terms, it means focusing on the disparities that have emerged in the Chinese society, working to overcome them, and devoting more attention to those left behind as China embraces economic reform.

    Hu's approach is in contrast to that of his predecessor, Jiang Zemin, whose policies favored those who could best exploit the opportunities of the New China. The result was a yawning gap between the overwhelming majority of Chinese who are poor and the new rich, increasing social tensions.

    The battle to shape policy has personal, political consequences. At the last Party Congress in 2002, Hu was named party general secretary and president of China. Yet those titles did not cut off Jiang's influence. Jiang's supporters remained in powerful positions and fought behind the scenes to ensure that his policies were not discarded. Their dissent was usually confined to closed-door discussions, but it periodically became public.

    After four years in office, Hu is now ready to consolidate his power. He took a critical first step in September when Chen Liangyu, the party secretary for Shanghai, was removed from office on charges of corruption. Officially, Chen was forced out for being implicated in a pension fund scandal that involved the misuse of funds to finance real-estate deals. However, there were two other important dimensions to the move.

    First, Shanghai was Jiang's power base and Chen was a longtime supporter of the former president. His removal sends a clear signal to Jiang's other supporters that they are vulnerable if they do not back the new president and his policies.

    Second, the firing is an attempt to reassert central government control over outlying regions. Chen had won the enmity of the central government by refusing orders to slow Shanghai's explosive growth. While Beijing is worried about the strains introduced by breakneck growth — overheating, corruption and widening disparities — local governments focus on new jobs, tax revenues and the opportunity to line their own pockets. Removing Chen sends a clear signal that such disobedience will not be tolerated.

    There will not be a bloodletting, however. Two party officials in Henan Province have already been replaced and Hu appointed a political ally as governor of Hunan Province and another as party head of Guangxi. Those moves send a clear-enough signal to the opposition. A full-scale purge could set off real and dangerous factionalism in the leadership.

    Hu's assertion of power may be gratifying to him and his team, but it will not end the problems faced by the Communist Party leadership. Hu is right to be concerned about the huge gaps between the rich and poor in China, but the program "to build a harmonious society" is all too silent on how that goal is to be achieved. Moreover, the ongoing "disobedience" by regional and state governments suggests that the central government may not have the tools it needs to enforce its will. It is unclear whether Beijing even has the accurate information essential to assessing the situation in distant provinces.

    Most troubling is the most dangerous flaw inherent in the one-party state. There is practically nothing a government can do to guarantee that power will not be abused. The inclination is always to cover up malfeasance rather than expose it, for fear of discrediting the party itself — as has happened so often in China's past. While Chen's case shows a readiness by Hu to confront misbehavior, he is clearly being used as an example. In other words, the leadership is only willing to tinker on the margins, rather than embrace systemic reform that is needed to truly fight corruption.

    As long as Hu and his fellow CCP members refuse to introduce independent checks on their power, then that power will be abused. That is a message the CCP is unlikely to take to heart in the runup to next year's Party Congress.

The Japan Times Weekly: October 21, 2006
(C) All rights reserved

    350人の中央委員会は中国共産党（党員7,000万人）の指導体制で、国家の基本政策を討議するため年次総会を開く。今年の総会のテーマは胡主席の基本路線に基づく「調和社会の構築」で、中国で顕著になりつつある格差の解消と、経済改革に取り残された国民の救済が目的となっていた。

    胡主席の基本政策は、前任者、江沢民氏の路線とは大いに異なる。江政権の政策は新中国の改革の波に乗る人たちを有利にし、新富裕層と貧困層との格差を拡大した。胡氏は02年の党大会で党総書記、国家主席に選任されたが、江氏の配下が支配的立場に残り、江政権の政策が継続されるように動いていた。

    その後4年経ち、胡主席は権力強化へ動いている。9月には上海市党委員会の陳良宇書記を汚職の疑いで解任した。

    上海は江氏の地盤であり、彼の強力な支持者だった陳氏の解任は、現政権を支持しなければ立場が危うくなるという警告であり、また中国政府の遠隔地への統制強化を象徴している。

    胡氏の権限強化で、党指導体制の問題が解決したわけではない。「調和社会の構築」計画は具体性に欠け、中央政府は地方政府を統制しきれないのが現状だ。

    中国のような一党独裁体制には、常に権力乱用の危険が伴う。不正行為については、摘発よりも隠蔽する力が働く。陳氏の解任は、不正の摘発というより明らかに見せしめだ。国家指導体制は、腐敗撲滅のための本質的改革に無関心だ。

    第三者による監視体制を導入しない限り、権力の乱用は続くだろう。中央委が来年の党大会に向け、その問題を検討する見込みはほとんどない。