Breakthrough with N. Korea
(From The Japan Times Feb. 15 issue)

北朝鮮の核問題、新局面へ

    The six-party talks have been fitful. There were high hopes in September 2005 when the fourth round of talks produced a declaration that identified basic principles for a deal. The Sept. 19 Joint Statement stipulated that the six parties should take coordinated steps to implement their agreement in a phased manner and in line with the principle of "commitment for commitment, action for action." Yet the very day after the declaration was released, North Korea and the United States showed deep disagreement about the terms of that agreement, its requirements and the process by which it would unfold.

    That divide was complicated by the imposition of financial sanctions by the U.S. on North Korean companies accused of involvement in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery and money laundering and counterfeiting of U.S. currency. For Pyongyang, those steps confirmed "the hostile policy of the U.S." toward North Korea and its view that Washington was not negotiating in good faith. North Korea insisted that the sanctions had to be lifted before the six-party talks could resume, and demanded direct bilateral talks with the U.S. Washington argued the issues were separate, but it was prepared to address them within the context of the six-party talks.

    North Korea's Oct. 9 nuclear test underscored the urgency of resuming negotiations. Washington and Pyongyang held bilateral discussions — "within the context of the six-party talks" — and the larger sessions resumed. After one break, the six agreed to a proposal revealed at the recent talks.

    The agreement calls for the North to shut down and seal its main nuclear reactor, including the reprocessing facility, and invite International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors back in to conduct all necessary monitoring and verification as agreed in the past.

    In addition, the North will provide a list of all its nuclear programs that it will abandon. In exchange, the U.S. and North Korea will start talks aimed at moving toward full diplomatic normalization of relations; a first step includes removing Pyongyang from the list of state sponsors of terrorism.

    Japan and North Korea will also start bilateral talks aimed at normalizing their relationship in accordance with the 2002 Pyongyang Declaration and "on the basis of the settlement of the unfortunate past and the outstanding issues of concerns." That includes compensation for the colonization of North Korea and accounting of abductees. The directly related parties will negotiate a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula "at an appropriate separate forum."

    None of this is free. The North will receive economic, energy and humanitarian assistance. For a start, in the next 60 days, Pyongyang will receive 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil, the first tranche of an eventual 1 million tons of heavy fuel oil. This is estimated to be equivalent to more than two-thirds of North Korea's entire oil consumption in 2004.

    This deal holds out the tantalizing prospect of a new relationship between North Korea and the world. If carried through, it would not only cap, but roll back North Korea's nuclear-weapons program as it aims at denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula.

    That is a big "if." The North's record of compliance is poor; its alleged cheating on the 1994 Agreed Framework created a crisis that led to the six-party talks. Suspicions have already been raised by Pyongyang's announcement that it is only temporarily suspending operations at its nuclear facilities.

    Japan has been continually frustrated by North Korea's failure to provide a full accounting of the abductees as demanded by the Pyongyang Declaration. For its part, North Korea is convinced that it has honored its obligations and its partners deserve the blame for the failure of previous agreements; Pyongyang may be paranoid but that does not make its perceptions any less real.

    Progress will be slow and difficult, with all sides eager to see fault in its partners' behavior. Negotiation and implementation of the deal itself is going to be a confidence-building process. Hardliners in three key capitals — Tokyo, Pyongyang and Washington — oppose any deal and will do their best to scuttle it. Their efforts will confirm the views of their like-minded counterparts that their partners cannot be trusted and the deal is worthless. They are wrong.

The Japan Times Weekly: Feb. 24, 2007
(C) All rights reserved

    6ヵ国協議は、昨年9月19日、核問題解決の基本原則について合意したが、その翌日には、米国と北朝鮮が条件、実行プロセス面で反目した。

    その後、米国が北朝鮮に対し金融制裁を課し、北朝鮮は制裁が解除されるまでは6ヵ国協議には参加を拒否するとの立場を取った。

    北朝鮮は10月9日、地下核実験を行い、6ヵ国協議の再開へ圧力が高まった。

    今回の合意の下で、北朝鮮は原子炉、核燃料再処理施設を停止し、国際原子力機関（IAEA）の査察団を受け入れ、放棄する核開発計画の一覧を提示する。米朝は、外交正常化について協議を開始するが、その第1歩として米国は北朝鮮に対するテロ支援国家指定を解除する。

    日本、北朝鮮も、02年の平壌宣言に基づき、「不幸な過去を清算し、懸案事項を解決することを基礎として」、国交正常化に向けた協議を開始する。懸案事項は、朝鮮半島植民地時代に対する補償と、日本人の北朝鮮への拉致問題を含む。

    北朝鮮は合意の見返りに、経済、エネルギー、人道援助を受ける。60日以内に、5万トンの重油、さらに初期段階と核施設の無能力化を含む次の段階で、上限100万トンの重油を受ける。

    この合意が実行されれば、朝鮮半島非核化へ進むことになるが、北朝鮮は1994年の枠組み合意も破っており、今回の合意も守られるかどうか疑問だ。日本は拉致問題をめぐり、繰り返し希望を打ち砕かれてきた。

    交渉と合意の実施は、信頼醸成が基本だ。日朝米の強硬派は、合意が無価値であるとして反故にしようとするだろうが、それは誤っている。