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4つ目の原則
4つ目の原則
核兵器を積んだアメリカ船の日本への入港が
1963年に日本の外相によって
許可されていたことが先日報じられ
話題を呼んでいるが
核兵器が持ち込まれていたかどうかより
もっと重要なことがある…。
Principle Four
By DOUGLAS LUMMIS
The Japanese government has a policy called "the three non-nuclear principles." According to this, the manufacture,
possession and introduction of nuclear weapons are prohibited in this country.
At the same time, under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, Japan is "protected" under the U.S. "nuclear umbrella."
But I consider the umbrella metaphor inappropriate, because nuclear weapons don't stop attacks the way umbrellas stop
rain. The nuclear umbrella means that whatever country attacks Japan risks being nuked by the United States.
This means the three non-nuclear principles are hypocritical insofar as they don't include principle four:
prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. If the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty is Japanese government policy, then the
nuclear umbrella — that is, the use of nuclear weapons — is also Japanese government policy. How much, then, does it
matter whether the umbrella-nukes are in Yokota Base, or on U.S. warships in the Pacific?
We have long known that the U.S. government considers principle three (nonintroduction) to be meaningless and does
not honor it. Every now and then some U.S. official mentions this, and the Japanese media react with shock, behaving as
though they were hearing it for the first time.
In 1981, no less a personage than Edwin Reischauer said in an interview that when he was U.S. ambassador here
(1961-1966) U.S. ships carrying nuclear weapons routinely entered Japanese ports. Typically, Japanese newspapers responded
with articles about the "Reischauer shock."
Now today's newspaper (Japan Times, Aug. 1) tells us the Japanese government has known about and consented to the
United States bringing nuclear weapons into Japan since 1963.
A telegram written by Reischauer in that year reveals that he explained to then-Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira
that the United States did not consider "nonintroduction" to mean that U.S. warships carrying nuclear weapons could not
enter Japanese ports. It goes on to say that Ohira assured Reischauer that the government agreed to this
interpretation.
This interpretation, of course, uses the logic of the swindler. Are we supposed to believe that the nukes haven't
entered Japan until they have passed through customs? The Maritime Safety Agency doesn't use the same logic with
regard to foreign vessels.
As I mentioned above, I am writing on the day the Reischauer telegram was revealed in the newspapers. By the time you
read this, presumably the Japanese government will have made some response. I don't know if they will deny having
accepted this interpretation or defend it.
It will be hard to deny, because Reischauer is a reliable source. And it will be hard to defend because its
reasoning is absurd. More impotantly, if the Japanese government truly believed that this interpretation (i.e., that
bringing nukes into Japanese ports is not "introduction") was reasonable, why did it keep its reasoning a secret from
the public for 36 years?
But what is most in need of discussion is principle four. For so long as the use of nuclear weapons is part of
national policy, where those weapons are located is a matter of secondary importance.
The Japanese government has a policy called "the three non-nuclear principles." According to this, the manufacture,
possession and introduction of nuclear weapons are prohibited in this country.
At the same time, under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, Japan is "protected" under the U.S. "nuclear umbrella."
But I consider the umbrella metaphor inappropriate, because nuclear weapons don't stop attacks the way umbrellas stop
rain. The nuclear umbrella means that whatever country attacks Japan risks being nuked by the United States.
This means the three non-nuclear principles are hypocritical insofar as they don't include principle four:
prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. If the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty is Japanese government policy, then the
nuclear umbrella — that is, the use of nuclear weapons — is also Japanese government policy. How much, then, does it
matter whether the umbrella-nukes are in Yokota Base, or on U.S. warships in the Pacific?
We have long known that the U.S. government considers principle three (nonintroduction) to be meaningless and does
not honor it. Every now and then some U.S. official mentions this, and the Japanese media react with shock, behaving as
though they were hearing it for the first time.
In 1981, no less a personage than Edwin Reischauer said in an interview that when he was U.S. ambassador here
(1961-1966) U.S. ships carrying nuclear weapons routinely entered Japanese ports. Typically, Japanese newspapers responded
with articles about the "Reischauer shock."
Now today's newspaper (Japan Times, Aug. 1) tells us the Japanese government has known about and consented to the
United States bringing nuclear weapons into Japan since 1963.
A telegram written by Reischauer in that year reveals that he explained to then-Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira
that the United States did not consider "nonintroduction" to mean that U.S. warships carrying nuclear weapons could not
enter Japanese ports. It goes on to say that Ohira assured Reischauer that the government agreed to this
interpretation.
This interpretation, of course, uses the logic of the swindler. Are we supposed to believe that the nukes haven't
entered Japan until they have passed through customs? The Maritime Safety Agency doesn't use the same logic with
regard to foreign vessels.
As I mentioned above, I am writing on the day the Reischauer telegram was revealed in the newspapers. By the time you
read this, presumably the Japanese government will have made some response. I don't know if they will deny having
accepted this interpretation or defend it.
It will be hard to deny, because Reischauer is a reliable source. And it will be hard to defend because its
reasoning is absurd. More impotantly, if the Japanese government truly believed that this interpretation (i.e., that
bringing nukes into Japanese ports is not "introduction") was reasonable, why did it keep its reasoning a secret from
the public for 36 years?
But what is most in need of discussion is principle four. For so long as the use of nuclear weapons is part of
national policy, where those weapons are located is a matter of secondary importance.
Shukan ST: Aug. 20, 1999
(C) All rights reserved
- three non-nuclear principles
- 非核三原則
- manufacture, possession and introduction
- 製造、保有、持ち込み
- are prohibited
- 禁じられている
- U.S.-Japan Security Treaty
- 日米安全保障条約
- "nuclear umbrella"
- 核の傘(核兵器保有国アメリカが、核兵器によって同盟国日本の安全を守る保障のこと)
- 〜 metaphor
- 〜 という隠喩
- inappropriate
- 不適切な
- risks being nuked by 〜
- 〜 から核攻撃を受ける危険をおかす
- hypocritical
- 偽善的な
- insofar as 〜
- 〜 である限りは
- umbrella-nukes
- 核の傘の役割を果たす核兵器
- Yokota Base
- 横田基地
- warships
- 軍艦
- meaningless
- 無意味な
- does not honor it
- 守っていない
- react with shock
- 衝撃を受けたという反応をみせる
- behaving as though 〜
- まるで 〜 であるかのようにふるまって
- no less a personage than 〜
- ほかならない 〜 その人
- Edwin Reischauer
- エドウィン・ライシャワー(1910ー1990)
- U.S. ambassodor
- 駐日米大使
- (has)consented to 〜
- 〜 を承諾した
- telegram
- 電報(ライシャワー大使が当時の大平正芳外相と話し合った内容を米国務長官宛てに送ったもの。「持ち込む」を、日本の土地における核の配備と保有と解釈したことについて)
- then-Foreign Minister
- 当時の外務大臣
- goes on to say that 〜
- 〜 と続けている
- assured 〜 that 〜
- 〜 に 〜 をうけ合った
- interpretation
- 解釈
- logic of the swindler
- 詐欺師の論法
- customs
- 税関
- Maritime Safety Agency
- 海上保安庁
- with regard to 〜
- 〜 に関して
- foreign vessels
- 外国籍の船
- presumably
- おそらく
- deny having accepted 〜
- 〜 を受け入れたことを否定する
- reliable source
- 確かな筋
- reasoning
- 論拠
- absurd
- 不合理な
- reasonable
- 筋の通った
- what is most in need of discussion is 〜
- 最も討議が必要なのは 〜 だ
- For so long as 〜
- 〜 である限りは
- matter of secondary importance
- 第二次的に重要なこと